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I ABSTRACT 
This research paper provides an overview of New Zealand's position with respect to the 
ILO Conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining, Conventions 87 
and 98. New Zealand is a member of the ILO but has never ratified either Convention 
due to non-compliance. 
Historically, New Zealand's industrial relations structures have not placed a high 
emphasis on the enforcement of the freedom of association, although collective 
bargaining was an implicit part of the framework until the enactment of the ECA in 1991 . 
Even so, New Zealand could not ratify Convention 98 during this period because of the 
Government's administrative and controls over the bargaining framework, thus 
preventing tripartite participation as required by the Convention. 
The ECA conferred on workers little more than the right to assembly, and completely 
disposed of the principles of collective bargaining. Legal freedom has no true value 
unless the individual has sufficient power to make use of it. Thus, legal freedom is 
contingent upon an individual's degree of social freedom. The ILO recognises this 
principle through the active promotion of freedom of association and the process of 
collective bargaining. 
Compliance with international standards, as established by the ILO, required New 
Zealand to radically review the system under' the Employment Contracts Act to promote 
the active enforcement of freedom of association in its broad context, as well as 
collective bargaining. The introduction of the Employment Relations Act fulfils these 
criteria. Freedom of association is protected under the ERA, and collective bargaining is 
reintroduced into the industrial relations environment, and encouraged as a means of 
redressing the inherent imbalance of bargaining power that exists between employers and 
employees. 
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It is submitted that under the new legislation, the ban-iers that previously prevented New 
Zealand from ratifying ILO Conventions 87 and 98 - are removed , and New Zealand may 
now entertain the possibility, for the first time since the inception of industrial law in 
New Zealand , that it affirms the principles and standards set out by the ILO. 
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II INTRODUCTION 
The ILO was established in 1919 in response to the plight of increasing numbers of 
workers internationally who were being exploited without any regard to their health or 
welfare. The stated purpose of the ILO was to adopt International Labour Standards that 
would have a concrete impact on working conditions and practices in every country in the 
world. 
ILO Standards are intended as a benchmark for employers' and workers' unions, both in 
their demands of government, and in ensuring that the unions' right to exist and represent 
their members' interests is affirmed. These Standards are also used by both non-
governmental and inter-governmental agencies as checks on the provision of human 
rights and social justice, as well as by regional organisations that use the Standards as 
guides for developmental policies and structures. 
There are two ILO Conventions that constitute the fundamental international labour 
standards on freedom of association. They are Convention 87, freedom of association and 
protection of the right to organise, and Convention 98, the right to organise and collective 
bargaining. The ILO regards Conventions 87 and 98 as "the most basic of all principles 
underlying the work of the ILO and the activities of those who toil for socialjustice".
1 It 
maintains that Conventions 87 and 98 embody those principles that are paramount to the 
work of the ILO, and the activities of those who strive for social justice. The intended 
effect of Conventions 87 is to establish the right for all workers
2 and employers to create 
and join organisations of their own choosing, without prior authorisation. Convention 98 
goes beyond this to provide protection for workers against anti-union discrimination, for 
protection of workers' and employers' organisations against interference by each other, 
and for measures to promote and encourage collective bargaining. The Conventions also 
1 !LO " Fundamental International Labour Standards on Freedom of Association" International Labour 
Standards, International Labour Organisation 
http ://www.lLO.org/public/engli ~h.'50norn1cs\vhatmc1rundamifoa .htm (last modified 23 February 1999) 
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enact a set of guarantees to allow such organisations to operate without interference from 
the public authorities of that State. 
Convention 87's function is to give all workers the right to create and join such 
organisations as they desire without the requirement of prior authorisation by the State or 
employer. The Convention also establishes guidelines designed to guarantee the 
perfomrnnce and functioning of these organisations without interference by the respective 
State ' s public authorities. 
Freedom of association is the ability to associate with whatever organisation a worker 
desires, free from recriminations, pressure or the need for approval by the worker's 
employer. Analogously, organisations are guaranteed under this Convention a right to 
exist and to operate free from pressure, intimidation or threat of cancellation by the State. 
Without the guarantee of protection of these rights, it would be impossible for trade 
unions and associated industrial organisations to exist permanently with any sense of 
security as they risked any amount of intimidation and pressure from State and 
employers, as well as employer or employer-biased organisations. Worse still, worker 
organisations may not have the ability to form at all in States without such protective 
measures afforded to them as by the Convention. 
Convention 98 is the second fundamental protection of trade union rights in the ILO and 
addresses the right to organise and collective bargaining. It provides for protection 
against anti-union discrimination, protection of workers' and employers' organisations 
against interference by each other, as well as promoting and encouraging collective 
bargaining. 
Collective bargaining describes the process of negotiations between employers and union 
officials, on behalf of those members who belong to the union concerned. Collective 
bargaining is a tool that can, when used effectively, address the inherent imbalance in 
2 
Conventions 87 and 98 refer to both empl oyer and worker orga ni sati ons . It is inte nded for the purposes o f 
this paper that where the word "worker" appears in re lation to worker or employer organi sa ti ons, such as 
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bargaining power between the individual worker and the individual emplo
yer. By 
standing together, workers have a greater chance of their demands for imp
roved working 
conditions being met. 
New Zealand has been a member State of the ILO since 1945. It has ratified 
neither of the 
Conventions discussed here, and therefore is not bound by them through r
atification. 
However, as a member of the ILO, New Zealand is bound by the ILO Con
stitution, which 
contains the same principles that are expressed in Conventions 87 and 98.
3 Accordingly, 
New Zealand could be subjected to the ILO's special system of supervisio
n as provided 
for the furtherance of the freedom of association Conventions. The only o
ther OECD 
country that has ratified neither Convention is the United States. 
New Zealand has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Politica
l Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Political Rights,
4 both of which contain 
provisions derived from Conventions 87 and 98. However, it must be note
d that New 
Zealand has entered reservations in respect of the articles relating to trade 
union rights. 
The reservations were included primarily because New Zealand's industri
al relations 
system at the time - compulsory unionism, union monopoly bargaining rig
hts, and the 
ability to deregister unions
5 
- did not meet the criteria set by the Covenants. 
The characteristics ofNew Zealand's industrial relations system in the per
iod 1894 
through 1987 originate from the 1894 legislation, the Industrial Conciliati
on and 
Arbitration Act. These included compulsory arbitration and conciliation fo
r the 
settlement of all industrial disputes. The national award system set legal m
inimum 
conditions of employment throughout the relevant industry or occupationa
l level, was 
legally binding on all workers and employers regardless of whether they w
ere a party to 
the award: so-called "blanket coverage". 
those in the nature of trade unions, for example, that word includes "emp
loyers" . 
3 lLO, Constitution Annex: "Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purpos
es of the International Labour 
Organisation" Ill(e) 
4 Conunonly referred to as the ICCPR and JCESPR respectively . 
Page 7 
NEW Z EALAND AND THE !LO CONVENTIONS 87 & 98 
Unions enjoyed monopoly bargaining rights and, after 1936, further security and a greater 
membership base with the advent of compulsory union membership. However, they paid 
a high price for such protection, as they were severely restricted in the strike action they 
were able to take under the law. Another fetter on unions, the most serious, was the 
Minister of Labour's ability to deregister a union. The consequences of deregistration 
were not only the cancellation of the union's registration and loss of its legislatively 
protected position, but also the confiscation of its assets. 
By the mid-1980s arbitration had become redundant for industrial dispute resolution . 
Most unions had move to direct negotiations with the industry employer organisations to 
settle disputes. The need for a new industrial relations framework had become very 
apparent. 
The Labour Government that came to power in 1984 made several significant changes to 
the industrial relations system, one of the most significant being the Labour Relations Act 
1987, which abolished the arbitration system. This Act retained the national award 
system, and acknowledged unions' need to strike effectively in a collective bargaining 
framework . It also gave more protection for strike action. The most significant change to 
the structure of trade unions was the introduction of a I ,OOO minimum membership 
requirement for registered unions , intended to allow a more modern and effective labour 
movement to develop. 
Labour' s most radical change during this period was the abolition of the distinction 
between private and state sector industrial relations in the State Sector Act 1988 . 
Compulsory union membership, the limited ability to strike and monopoly bargaining 
powers prevented the New Zealand industrial relations framework from complying with 
Conventions 87 and 98 - freedom of association could not be facilitated under such a 
system. 
5 Prior to the enactment of the ECA in 1991. 
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The Employment Contracts Act 1991 replaced the system of compulsory industrial 
conciliation and arbitration with what it refers to in the Long Title of the Act, as the 
promotion of an "efficient" labour market. Trade unions are completely ignored in the 
legislation. Individual bargaining is encouraged by the Act, and there is no 
acknowledgement of the disparity in power between the parties negotiating an 
employment contract. Instead, the ECA purports to give "freedom of choice" to the 
parties in terms of the nature of the contractual arrangement they wish to be governed by. 
However, "freedom of choice", as provided by the Act, cannot be effective where the 
parties desire different outcomes from the negotiating process and the outcome of such 
negotiations are determined by the relative power of the parties involved. There is also no 
obligation on the employer to negotiate with a worker's representative (union or 
otherwise), thus reinforcing the power imbalance between worker and employer. 
The New Zealand Council of Trade Unions filed a complaint of violations of freedom of 
association with the ILO in 1993. The complaint alleged that the 1991 Act violated ILO 
principles of freedom of association, particularly in the collective bargaining process and 
by its restrictions on the right to strike. This complaint, the New Zealand Government's 
response, and the ILO 's report on the New Zealand situation will be closely examined in 
this paper. 
New Zealand, whilst the ECA is in force, breaches the requirements of Conventions 87 
and 98 . Freedom of association is not promoted under the current regime - under the 
"freedom of choice" regime under the ECA, workers ' choice to belong to unions and 
have those unions recognised as their representatives is negated if the employer does not 
wish this to occur. The absence of any requirement for an employer to negotiate with the 
worker's appointed representative has a similar effect. Collective bargaining is not 
promoted by the ECA; it is not even required to be acknowledged. 
The Employment Relations Act replaces the controversial ECA on 2 October this year. 
The new Act purports to facilitate greater union involvement in the workplace and in 
workplace negotiations. The introduction of "good faith bargaining" and the return of the 
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ability for unions to strike effectively will further enable unions to participate fully as 
representatives of their members. These benefits of the new legislation are not however 
without their controversies. Many, including the New Zealand Business Roundtable and 
the New Zealand Employers' Federation, are concerned that good faith bargaining will 
cause undue disruption to the 'negotiation' system as it currently exists. The same parties 
have expressed fears that the reintroduction of the right to strike will cause a return to the 
'black days' of widespread sympathy strikes and industrial unrest. This paper will 
examine the changes to the current scheme, and discuss how these amendments will 
affect the New Zealand industrial relations system, and whether they will effectively 
address the ILO non-compliance position that is the current situation. 
This research paper will provide a comprehensive overview of New Zealand's position 
with respect to the ILO Conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining, 
Conventions 87 and 98 . Part II will introduce the ILO and discuss its history, structure 
and objectives. It will also set out Conventions 87 and 98. It is intended that a 
chronological approach will highlight New Zealand's shift from positions of non-
compliance, through to intended compliance under the new Employment Relations Act. 
This will be dealt with in Part III of the research paper, chronicling the 1894-1990 period 
and the Employment Contracts Act years of 1991 to 2000, including the New Zealand 
Council of Trade Union's complaint to the ILO alleging New Zealand's breach of the 
Conventions. Part III will also introduce the new era of industrial relations under the 
Employment Relations Act. At each stage of Part III, the legislative and judicial 
framework will be investigated and compared to the ILO Standards to see where they are 
compatible, are where New Zealand is in breach of the Standards set by the ILO in 
Conventions 87 and 98. 
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III THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION 
A The Establishment of the !LO 
1 The 1919 Paris Peace Conference 
During the First World War trade union organisations of both camps demanded that the 
Peace Treaty include clauses for improving the plight of workers . The Allied 
Governments took these demands into consideration and established, as part of the Paris 
Peace Conference, a Commission on International Labour Legislation. The Commission 
was given the following tenns of reference: 
That a Commission, composed of two representatives apiece from the five Great Powers. 
and five representatives to be elected by the other Powers represented at the Peace 
Conference, be appointed to enquire into the conditions of employment from the 
international aspect and to consider the international means necessary to secure common 
action on matters affecting conditions of employment, and to recommend the form of a 
permanent agency to continue such enquiry and consideration in cooperation with and 
under the direction of the League of Nations. 
The Commission had to deal with the important question of whether it should propose 
that the Peace Treaty should include a full-fledged Constitution of a permanent 
international labour organisation, or whether it should simply recommend the inclusion of 
a general declaration of principles, a kind of Labour Charter. 
Although during the course of its discussions the Commission dealt with many other 
important points, there is one that should be mentioned here. The original draft of the 
Preamble was worded as follows: 
Whereas the League of Nations has for its object the establishment of international peace, 
and such a peace can be established only if it is based on the prosperity and contentment 
of all classes in all nations . 
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The Commission decided to amend the second clause to read "and such a peace can be 
established only if it is based upon social justice." This second clause came to symbolise 
the main objective of the International Labour Organisation ("ILO"). It is also one of the 
main objectives of the ILO's Convention 87, the right to freedom of association. 
The Commission's report contained two parts; Part I contained the Constitution of the 
proposed ILO, and Part II contained a list of general principles on labour matters. These 
texts were embodied in the Treaty of Versailles as Part XIII. 
6 
Although the Paris Peace Conference is remembered mostly for its short-lived policies 
and decisions on economic and political affairs, its main decision in the field of social 
policy - the establishment of the ILO - continues to have a far-reaching impact on the 
world. 
2 The Declaration of Philadelphia 
The International Labour Conference has met at least once a year, except during the 
Second World War, since its inaugural meeting in Washington, in October 1919. 
In May 1944, near the close of the Second World War, the International Labour 
Conference met in Philadelphia and adopted a Declaration that reaffirmed in particular 
that labour is not a commodity. The Declaration also maintained that "freedom of 
expression and of association are essential to sustained progress"
7
. The Declaration still 
constitutes the Charter of the aims and objectives of the ILO, and is annexed to the 
Constitution. As the ILO's Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations stated in the report of its 1997 Session:
8 
6 For a more detailed account of the history of international labour law, see Follows and Shotwell. 
7 International Labour Organisation, Declaration of Philadelphia, l(b) 
8 !LO: Report of the Committee of Experts on the Conventions and Recommendations: General report and 
observations concerning particular countries, Report Ill (Part I A), International Labour Conference, 86'h 
Session, 1998, Geneva, 16017, paras 56-58. 
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The ILO's standards and practical activities on human rights are closely related to the 
universal values laid down in the Declaration . . . [T]he ILO's standards on human rights 
along with the instruments adopted by the UN and in other international organisations 
give practical application to the general expressions of human inspirations made in the 
Universal Declaration [of Human Rights], and have translated into binding terms the 
principles of that noble document." 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims in Article 23, paragraph 4, that 
"everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests." It is a more specific manifestation of the right expressed in Article 20 to "the 
right of freedom of peaceful assembly and association." 
The inclusion in the Universal Declaration of the principle of freedom of association is 
preceded by its inclusion in three significant ILO instruments: the Constitution, the 
Declaration of Philadelphia, and the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right 
to Organise Convention, 1948. The Constitution considered that the right of association is 
of "special and urgent importance" for both workers and employers. 9 The Declaration of 
Philadelphia reaffirmed freedom of association as one of the fundamental principles on 
which the ILO was based, and characterised it as "essential to sustained progress", one 
without which the ILO could not hope to achieve its goals. The third instrument, 
Convention 84, refers not only to the right of employers and workers to associate for any 
legal purpose, but also to collective agreements, consultations and the solution of labour 
conflicts. 
Since 1948, the ILO and the United Nations have developed along parallel lines as far as 
freedom of association issues are concerned, and regional organisations have also 
developed both standards and supervisory capacity. 
9 Prior to its removal following an amendment in 1946, the above quote from the ILO 's Constitution was 
preceded by the phrase "for a ll lawful purposes". 
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B /LO 's Definition of "Trade Union" 
The ILO defines a trade union as "an organisation of employees, usually associated 
beyond the confines of one enterprise, established for protecting or improving, through 
collective action, the economic and social status of its members."
10 
This definition is different from the definitions of "trade union" as contained in the 
Employment Relations Act and its preceding legislation, the consequences of which will 
be discussed below. 
C Convention 87: Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise 
Freedom of association is accepted internationally as a fundamental human right. 11 In a 
labour law context, freedom of association is paramount to the collective bargaining 
process - it relates directly to workers ' rights to organise and form trade unions to 
advance their employment interests . In its simplest sense, the principle may be reduced to 
an individual ' s right to do collectively what one is entitled to do individually. 12 Without 
this right, the role of trade unions is seriously impaired. 
Freedom of association is usually given an expansive definition when used in a labour 
law context. The ILO Conventions 87 and 98 promote this interpretation. The right is 
most often interpreted in a positive sense as the protection of the workers' right to join a 
union to safeguard their rights and further advance their interests . There is however also a 
negative right attached to the freedom of association, that is, the right not to join a union 
or other association. It is this negative right that has grown increasingly prominent in 
recent years. There are two reasons for this: the first is the gradual recognition of such a 
10 ILO, !LO Thesaurus, (3ed, Geneva, ILO, 1985) 384 . 
11 
David A Morse, The Origin and Evolution of the !LO and Its Role in the World Community, (ILR, 
Come I I, New York, 1969) I I. 
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right as a facet of individual liberty, and the second is the use of this right as a fayade for 
anti-unionism, for example the right to work laws in parts of the USA .13 
The Declaration of Philadelphia 1944 asserts that freedom of association is "essential to 
sustained progress". 14 Convention 87 is deemed to be binding on a member State by 
virtue of their membership of the ILO, regardless of ratification of that Convention. The 
position of the ILO is that "[b ]y membership of the !LO itself, each member State is 
bound to respect a certain number of principles, including the principles of freedom of 
association which have become rules above Con ventions' ' .15 
It should be noted that both membership of the ILO and compliance with its standards are 
voluntary. New Zealand cannot be forced to retain its membership of the ]LO, or to 
comply with its standards. However, the weight of its recommendations is such that they 
should not be ignored. 16 
Article 11 of Convention 87 requires the government to "take all necessary and 
appropriate measures to ensure that workers ... may freely exercise the right to organise." 
Thus, the Article not only confers the right to organise, but requires positive intervention 
for the promotion and protection of this right. 
The presumption on all ILO member States that they are bound by the principles of 
freedom of association regardless of their ratification status, is backed by the assertion 
that complaints may also be presented to the Committee on Freedom of Association 
("CF A") concerning alleged member States ' behaviour without requiring that State to 
have ratified Convention 87.17 It is this provision which enabled the New Zealand 
12 S Leader, Freedom of Association: A Study in Labour Law and Political Theory (Yale University Press, 
New Haven, 1992) 
13 Charles Hansen, Sheila Jackson and Douglas Miller, The Closed Shop: A Comparative Study in Public 
Policy and Trade Union Security in Britain, the USA and West Gennany (Gower, Aldershot, 1982) 
14 Declaration of Philadelphia 1944 I 
15 ILO, Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing 
Body of the !LO (1995) 
16 Tonia Novitz, "New Zealand Industrial Relations and the International Labour Organisation : Resolving 
Contradictions Implicit in Freedom of Association" NZJIR 21 (2) 119, 125 . 
17 ILO above n 15, para 53 
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Council of Trade Unions ("NZCTU") to lodge its complaint against the New Zealand 
Government with the IL0. 18 
D Convention 98: The Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
The Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949, provides firstly that 
"workers shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of anti-union discrimination in 
respects of their employment". 19 This provision aims to protect workers and trade union 
leaders from victimisation by their employers both at the time of taking up employment 
and during the course of the employment relationship. This protection applies especially 
to those acts designed to make the employment of a worker subject to the condition that 
the worker will not join a union , or will relinquish union membership. 20 
The Convention also provides that the protection shall apply equally to acts calculated to 
cause the dismissal of or otherwise prejudice a worker by reason of union membership or 
because of participation in union activities outside working hours or. with the consent of 
the employer, within working hours. 21 
Another aim of the Convention is protection, primarily of trade unions, against 
interference. According to Article 2, "workers' and employers' organisations shall enjoy 
adequate protection against any acts of interference by each other or each others ' agents 
or members in their establishment, functioning or administration. "22 In particular, acts 
designed to promote the establishment of workers' organisations under the dominance o( 
employers ' organisations or to support workers' organisations by financial or other 
18 Discussed at Part III(B)(3) below. 
19 
Article I . See more generally Bartolomei de la Cruz, Protection against Anii-Union Discriminall on, 
(ILO, Geneva, 1976). 
20 
Anne Boyd, "The Freedom of Association in the Employment Contracts Act 1991 : What has it Mea nt for 
Trade Unions and the Process of Collective Bargaining in New Zealand?" 28 Cal. W. I nt' I. L.J . 65, 70. 
2 1 Article 1(2)(a) & (b). 
22 Article 2( I) . 
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means, with the object of placing such organisations under the control of employers or 
employers' organisations are described as constituting such acts of interference.
23 
Article 3 provides that machinery appropriate to national conditions shall be established 
where necessary to ensure respect for, and implementation of, the provisions discussed 
above. 
To create conditions for successful voluntary negotiation between employers and 
workers, Article 4 provides that "measures appropriate to national conditions shall be 
established, where necessary, to encourage and promote the full development and 
utilisation of machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers' organisations and 
workers' organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of 
employment by means of collective agreements."24 The voluntary nature of collective 
bargaining must be stressed. It is in accordance with this principle that the supervisory 
bodies of the IL025 have considered that the system of official approval by a government 
authority to make an agreement valid is contrary to the Convention. However,
26 
If as part of its stabilisation policy, a government decides that wage rates cannot be 
settled freely through collective bargaining, such restriction should be imposed as an 
exceptiona l measure and only to the extent that it is necessary, without exceeding a 
reasonable period, and it should be accompanied by adequate safeguards to protect 
workers' living standards. 
E Structure of the !LO 
23 Article 2(2). 
24 Article 4. 
I Tripartite Structure 
25 The Committee of Experts, and the Freedom of Association Comminee. 
26 ProfN Yalticos and Prof G von Potobsky, International labour law, (2ed, Kluwer Law & Taxation 
Publishers, Boston, 1995) l 00 . 
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A unique and essential characteristic of the ILO is the tripartite structure. 27 It is composed 
not only of government representatives, but also ofrepresentatives of employers' and 
workers' organisations. The principle of tripartism influences, in many respects, the 
characteristics as well as the content of the instruments adopted by the ILO. The principle 
is aimed at inspiring confidence among employers' and workers' representatives, to 
entrust them with responsibilities and associate, with a view to achieving social peace, 
these two parties - often opposed to each other - with governmental action.28 Tripartism 
also ensures a democratic control of the activity of the ILO. 
2 Membership 
In keeping with its very objective, the ILO has always aimed at universality in its 
membership. An international labour organisation that did not aim at universality would 
indeed be a contradiction in terms! But universality does not mean uniformity. This was 
emphasised in a report to the 1954 Conference.29 
Paramount [in the concept universality] is the idea that the aims and purposes of the ILO 
and the action that it takes must correspond with the needs of all the peoples throughout 
the world, whatever social or economic regime exists in their countries. The principle of 
universality also means that the functioning of the ILO should not be designed solely to 
fit any given social system or to impose a pattern of social structure to be uniformly 
applied. 
There are two ways for a State to be admitted to membership in the IL0.3° First, any 
State Member of the United Nations may become a Member of the ILO by 
communicating its formal acceptance of the obligations of the Constitution of the ILO. 
27 For more on the principle oftripartism see CW Jenks, "The Significance for International Law of the 
Tripartite Character of the International Labour Organisation", Transactions of the Grotius Society, Vol 22, 
(London, 1957) 45 -81 and the International Protection of Trade Union Freedom (London, 1957) 92-141 ; 
A Berenstein, Les Organisations Ouvrieres, leur competence et leur role dans la SDN, notamment dans 
I 'GIT, (Paris, 1936); Bernard Beguin, "!LO and the Tripartite System", International Conciliation, No 523 
(May, 1959) 
28 Yalticos, above n 26, 35 
29 
ILO, Record of Proceedings, International Labour Conference, 1954, 436. 
30 Art 1, paras 2 - 4 of the Constitution of the ILO. 
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Secondly, the Conference of the ILO may admit Members by a vote concurred in by two-
thirds of the delegates attending the Session, including two-thirds of the government 
delegates present and voting. The majority of the admissions to membership are by way 
of the first procedure. 
F International Labour Standards 
1 Function 
One of the ILO's most important and visible functions is the adoption of Conventions and 
Recommendations that set international standards. These Recommendations provide 
guidance on policy, legislation and practice. The general trend of these standards has 
been the constant broadening of their scope, including the fields covered, the categories 
of the persons protected and the framework within which the matters are treated . A 
number of these instruments go beyond the traditional field of Jabour Jaw and touch on 
matters of civil liberties, such as freedom of association.
31 Freedom of association is 
regarded by the ILO as a cornerstone of social justice, necessary to secure the 
Organisation ' s objective of universal, permanent peace. 
2 Purpose 
International labour standards have several purposes. The three regarded as the most 
important are to mitigate the potentially adverse effects of international market 
competition, social justice and the consolidation of peace. 
(a) International Market Competition: 
The Director-General of the ILO observed in 1997 that the effects of international 
competition that have been argued as creating an obstacle to improved conditions of 
labour are a target of, and reason for, international labour standards;
32 
Leaving aside the various interpretations which divide the specialists, it is highly likely 
that public opinion will continue to believe widely that globalisation (the complex 
31 Convention 87 
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phenomenon of economic interdependency resulting from trade in goods and services and 
capital flows) inevitably implies a downward levelling of pay for jobs of equal (low) 
skills in a market in which goods and capital can freely circulate ... [T]his liberalisation [of 
trade, as a part of globalisation] carries the risk, as the Preamble to the Constitution of the 
ILO warns us, that international competition, by inhibiting the will of certain members lo 
introduce progress, might be ' an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to 
improve the conditions in their own countries."' 
The Director-General went on to argue that the ILO ' s standard setting activities had to 
meet the challenge posed by globalisation by reaffirming the value of social justice and 
working with Member Stated to strive for it in the context of opportunities created by a 
vibrant world economy.33 
Professors Valticos and von Potobsky, authors of International Labour Law34 disagree 
with the Director-General ' s claims that globalisation necessarily prevents fair trade or 
fair working conditions. They purport that this argument has been given less prominence 
"since it has been steadily realised that costs and the competition value of products 
depend on many factors other than labour costs."35 
However, the professors agree that the harmonisation of social policy may help to reduce 
the opportunities for unfair competition and thereby safeguard world markets and 
facilitate economic integration and the movement of capital , goods and manpower. 36 
(b) The Consolidation of Peace 
At the end of the First World War it became apparent that injustice in the social fi eld 
endangers peace in the world and that against such injustice therefore serves the cause of 
peace. As stated in the Preambl e to the Constitution of the fLO '' .. . universal and lasting 
peace can be established only if it is based on social justice". 
32 
Dr Michael Hansenne, The /LO, Standards Selling and G/oba/isal ion, ( ILO, G eneva, 1997) 
33 http: / /\vww. I LO .org/pub I ic 'engl ish 'standa rds inon n/wll\'nec:d :[brcomp.h tm 
34 Valticos, above n 26, 20-24 . 
35 Valticos, above n26 , 21. 
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Measures of social justice that provide, amongst other things, for trade union rights, are 
bound to strengthen democratic regimes, which are more likely than authoritarian 
governments to be peace loving. Stress has equally been laid on the positive and dynamic 
concept of peace, involving the establishment of stable, just and harmonious conditions 
both within individual countries and between different countries by eliminating, inter 
alia, rivalry on world markets arising out of too great a disparity between labour 
conditions;37 
It has also been claimed that the establishment of international Jabour standards aimed at 
improving the condition of mankind develops a common sense of solidarity 
internationally and fosters a climate of mutual collaboration and understanding 
transcending racial and national differences. 
The cornerstone of the system of international labour standards is hope for "the defeat of 
social injustice, the cynicism which accepts it as an inevitable part of the human 
experience, and the possibility that lasting peace is incrementally easier to achieve with 
each and every defeat anywhere of social injustice."38 
(c) Social Justice 
The driving force behind the idea of international Jabour Jaw was not the notion of social 
justice only as a factor of peace, but also for its own sake. Social justice is, in its own 
right, an objective of international labour law even if little emphasis was placed on it 
initially. The Preamble quoted above continues " ... The High Contracting Parties moved 
by sentiments of justice and humanity, as well as by the desire to secure the permanent 
peace of the world, agree ... etc". 
The notion of social justice is constantly evolving to keep place with rapid technical and 
social change. A growing need for security and wellbeing is accompanied by a desire for 
36 Valticos, above n26 , 24. 
37 Valticos, above n26, 25. 
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greater freedom, more equality and a greater measure of participation in the management 
of society, as well as a better quality of life and a substantial improvement in working 
conditions. It embraces the general welfare of mankind in the broad sense, as defined by 
the Declaration of Philadelphia. The notion of social justice has developed to mean, at an 
international level, that "the world community is not responsible only for the 
maintenance of peace and good relations between States, but also for an active 
contribution to the welfare of mankind ."
39 
3 Enforcement 
The ILO' s system of enforcement is based on the ratification of a labour standard and an 
obligation of regular, periodic reporting on measures taken to give effect to the provisions 
of the standard. 
For specific allegations against a Member State, special systems of supervision have been 
established. However, Articles 24 and 26 of the ILO Constitution require that the 
Member State complained of has ratified the Convention concerned. An exception to thi s 
rule is any complaint concerning the Convention concerning the freedom of association, 
Convention 87. Allegations concerning the infringement of freedom of association 
principles may be brought against a Member State even if they have not ratified 
Convention 87. 
In addition to the regular system of supervision, there are also special supervisory 
mechanisms for the enforcement of freedom of association principles, as espoused in 
Conventions 87 and 98. The need for additional supervisory bodies arose from the fact 
that under current provisions, if a State did not ratify these Conventions, there would be 
no means by which the International Labour Conference could supervise their 
application. 
The Committee on Freedom of Association ("CF A") was established in 1951 to examine 
complaints made by governments, workers' and employers' organisations that member 
38 http://www. I LO.org/publ ic/engl ish/stondc1rds/11orm/wh\'lleed/pcace.htm 
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States are not respecting the basic principles of freedom of association. The complaints 
may be examined whether or not the country concerned has ratified the ILO's 
Conventions on freedom of association, as the procedure of examination is based on 
constitutional principles. 
The second mechanism is the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of 
Association ("FFCC"). The FFCC was established in 1950, and examines complaints of 
infringements on trade union rights that are referred to it by the ILO 's Governing Body. 
These complaints may be in respect of both countries that have ratified the freedom of 
association Conventions and those that have not; although in the case of the latter, the 
referral cannot be made without the consent of the country concerned. The FFCC may 
also examine complaints of violations of freedom of association amongst non-member 
States of the ILO when such complaints are forwarded to it by the United Nations and the 
country consents to the examination. 
G The !LO as an International Benchmark 
The ILO is regarded as a "global model for workplace rights and responsibilities ."
40 As 
such, it is regarded as the Member States' obligation to realise them as far as possible, 
and the ILO 's mission to promote their reali sation. International labour standards are 
used as a benchmark for the provisions of human rights, and are used as such by 
international no-governmental agencies as well as inter-governmental agencies. They are 
also used for guidance by regional organisation in the development of policies aimed at 
harmonising their labour and social policies. 
After the Second World War, the influence of the standards was particularly noteworthy 
in the newly independent countries. As the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare of 
Malaya told the Conference in 1958: "whenever labour legislation is contemplated or any 
changes are considered, our first thought is always 'what do ILO Conventions say on the 
matter?"' Or, as the Secretary if Labour in the Philippines said in 1955, his government 
39 EJ Phelan, Yes and Albert Thomas, (Cresset Press, London, 1949) 54. 
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was implementing a set of labour laws, "most of them patterned after ILO 
Conventions. "41 
IV NEW ZEALAND'S POSITION IN TERMS OF THE ILO 
A The Pre-Employment Contracts Act Era 
1 The Early Growth of Trade Unions: 
The first industrial show of force to occur in New Zealand was a carpenter who refused to 
work unless his tem1s were met. Samuel Parnell, upon his arrival at Petone beach from 
England in 1840, was asked to build a storehouse for a local merchant. He agreed, but 
only on the condition that the working hours on this project not exceed eight hours per 
day. This was an unheard of and extravagant demand, especially when it was still 
commonplace for the English working day to be 14 to 16 hours long. The merchant of 
course refused, but Parnell remained firm on his conditions. There was a great shortage of 
skilled carpenters in the colony - only two others besides Parnell - and the merchant was 
forced to concede to Parnell's demands in order that his storehouse be built.42 
Pamell's stand set the tone for industrial relations in New Zealand, and first trade union 
to be formed in New Zealand was dedicated to preserving the eight-hour day established 
by Parnell.43 Other tradesmen followed Parnell's example, and met the incoming ships to 
tell the newly arrived tradesmen of the practised working day, with any offenders to be 
dunked in the harbour. 44 
The huge demand for labour and skills in colonial New Zealand meant that the working 
class held some power in the bargaining stakes, and did not hesitate to use their labour 
power as leverage to demand better treatment. The Colonial Government tried to 
40 http: //www. I LO .org, pub! icienQJ ish!srnndarci s/nonnihowused: i ndex. lnm 
41 GA Johnston, The international Labour Organisation, (Europa Publications, London, 1970) l 04. 
42 Roth Trade Unions in New Zealand (Reed Education, Wellington , 1973) 3 
43 The Benevolent Society of Carpenters and Joiners, formed in 1842 . 
44 Roth, above n42, 3 
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introduce cheaper Maori labour into the workforce as a means of redressing this balance 
of power, but this hope was short-lived as the Maori workers demanded equal treatment 
for equal work, and were prepared to fight for it. This is illustrated by the strike of 350 
Maori employed on the railway lines in 1841, when told that they would have part of 
their income docked to cover the cost of rations. 
Trade unions as they first appeared in the colony resembled craft unions and were 
composed of skilled tradesmen rather than industrial unions of oppressed workers. They 
formed for the purpose of fighting a particular issue, and usually collapsed upon their 
defeat, which was often. The issues were mostly attacks by employers attempting to 
reduce wages or worsen conditions, and seldom saw the demand of improved wages or 
conditions by workers. For example, the Bootmakers' Union struck approximately 50 
times prior to 1895, and each time was in response to proposed wage cuts.45 
Unions continued to develop very rapidly in New Zealand, although until the late 1880s, 
were short-lived bodies. The Trade Union Act 1878 gave trade unions legal legitimacy 
for the first time, but they continued for several years to exist on a temporary means-to-
an-end basis, with little permanency or Jong-term structure. At this point the ILO had not 
yet been created, and there were no international bodies in existence with the objective of 
furthering the cause of trade union rights, and improving the plight of workers. 
In October 1889 the Maritime Council of New Zealand was established after a surge in 
support for the socialist aims of trade unionism. The Council originated in Dunedin, with 
the seamen, watersiders and miners unions, and became the first national organisation of 
trade unions. The railways, clerical and manual workers, and storemen unions soon 
joined them.46 New Zealand unionists began to see themselves as representatives of the 
new working class, and the universal notion of unionism took hold. The New Zealand 
unions were determined to move away from the English class system that had subjugated 
45 Geare The System of Industrial Relations in New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 1988) 29 
46 The unions were the Seamen' s Union, Wharf Labourers ' Union, the West Coast Miners, the Mercantile 
Marine Officers' Association, the Wharf Carters' Expressmen's and Storemen's Union, and the 
Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants. 
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workers and placed all control over wages and working conditions into the hands of the 
employers. 
The purpose of the Maritime Council was to 
form a deliberative and representative body which is possessed of a special knowledge of 
the matters coming under its cognisance, and which by an aggregation of power can 
enforce the carrying out of legitimate and necessary reforms where a single Union might 
find the task beyond its individual strength.47 
In early 1890 a Royal Commission was established to investigate the practise of 
"sweating" in factories - a euphemism for the extreme exploitation of workers, 
particularly women and children. The ensuing Report was strongly in favour of the 
presence of trade unions, which were seen as "a means of preventing both excessive 
hours of work and the sinking of wages to below subsistence levels."48 During the course 
of the year unionism enjoyed a great increase, thanks at least in part, to the favourable 
report. 
This boom phase in the development of trade unions ended with the 1890 Maritime 
strike. The strike had originated as a dispute in Australia between the Australian 
Maritime Council (with whom its New Zealand counterpart had links) and involved most 
major New Zealand unions, especially those involved in transport, mines and related 
industries. 
The strike lasted from August until November 1890 when, decimated, the unions still 
involved - for many had withdrawn their active support before this point - were 
instructed by the Maritime Council to arrange what terms they could for their members to 
return to work. On 10 November the strike officially ended after 56 days when the 
Council called off the seamen's strike. 
47 Maritime Labour Council of New Zealand, Proposed Basis and Rules of the Maritime Council, 
(Dunedin, I 889) 
48 Geare, above n45 , 29 
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The effect of the strike was devastating on unions. Unions had invested all of their 
resources into the strike, and those who were not completely crushed by the end were 
severely weakened. Employers nationwide took advantage of the situation, giving 
preference to non-union workers, and forcing workers to sign undertakings that they 
would not join a union whilst employed. The Maritime Council disintegrated after the 
strike, and most of the new unions formed so quickly in 1889 and 1890 followed suit in 
the early 1890s. Attempts by workers to revive any of these unions were quickly 
suppressed by employers and the government.
49 
In 1890 there were reported to be some 200 trade unions in New Zealand comprising 
63,000 members. By 1894, this figure dropped to a mere 70 unions and an estimated 
membership of 8,000.50 Thus New Zealand was left with somewhat of a 'green-fields' 
situation by the mid-1890s where the playing field was largely empty of existing trade 
unions. This proved to be the perfect environment, from the new Liberal Government's 
perspective, into which to introduce a new framework of legislation that would redress 
the balance of power in favour of the unionists and improve the workers' bargaining 
power within the limits of the wage system. If successful, this would give trade unions 
legitimacy, without allowing them the extent of power they had almost acquired prior to 
the Maritime Strike. 
2 The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 189-1: 
Section 91 of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act ("IC&AA") specified that 
the Public Sector did not come within the ambit of the Act. This separation remained 
until the passage of the Labour Relations Act in 1987. Accordingly, the Public and 
Private sectors will be dealt with separately in this section. 
_
49 Roth, above n42, 17. Also JT Paul, labour and the Future (Executive of the New Zealand Trades and 
Labour Council's Federation of Labour, Dunedin, 1911), 12. 
50 Roth, above n42, 21 
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3 The Private Sector 
(a) The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
The objective of the IC&AA was to provide machinery for the peaceful settlement of 
industrial disputes, but the intention according to the title of the Act was also to 
"encourage the formation of industrial unions and associations". The encouragement 
came in the ability for trade unions to register with as few as seven members, and having 
registered, the trade unions then acquired sole bargaining and protection rights under the 
Act. 
Under the IC&AA, trade unions were required to register, in order to gain access to the 
arbitration system, and if registered, were bound to comply with the conciliation and 
arbitration process as an alternative to strikes and lockouts if peaceful settlement was not 
reached in an industrial dispute. This situation continued until 1984, with the exception of 
a brief period during the depression when compulsory arbitration was repealed. The 1984 
amendment to the Industrial Relations Act (IRA), provided that arbitration was available 
only if both disputing parties agreed to it. 
The reaction by trade unions to the new legislation was split. The craft workers saw 
registration as a satisfactory price to pay for the foregoing of strike action, which was 
wholly outlawed under the IC&AA and replaced instead with a system of compulsory 
arbitration. The general workers however, which consisted mostly of unskilled workers in 
"industrial" unions such as those in transport and mining, were not satisfied with the 
IC&AA, as through it they lost a valuable leverage mechanism in negotiations - that of 
the strike, or threat thereof. 
The IC&AA was based on the principle that the State "had a right and a duty to intervene 
in labour disputes and impose a settlement on the parties when they were unable to 
resolve their differences by peaceful negotiations."
51 It introduced a system of 
51 Holt Compulsory Arbitration in New Zealand (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1986) 15 
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compulsory arbitration designed to operate within New Zealand. Trade unions were 
integral to the system as bargaining parties on behalf of their members in any industrial 
dispute. 
Compulsory arbitration required unions to facilitate the representation of workers in 
conciliation and before the Arbitration Court. However, the type of unions envisaged by 
the legislation was undoubtedly somewhat different to that which traditional unionists 
may have desired. William Pember-Reeves revealed his political agenda in promoting the 
Act when he declared that it52 
deliberately encourages workmen to organise. When in obedience to the law, they 
renounce striking and register as industrial unions, it does not seem amiss that they 
should receive some special consideration ... A union which may not strike, and may not 
shut out any decent workman in its trade who wishes to join it, is a union left with little 
power for mischief, however much it may do legally and peacefully for its members. 
This steady growth of registered unions under the new regime continued throughout the 
first half of the Twentieth Century. Trade unionism had taken on an entirely new concept 
- the unions existed, and were protected by the State, but in return they were heavily 
restricted in their freedom and ability to act. For most of the trade unions, however, this 
was not a bad thing. The legislation offered them protection and guaranteed continued 
existence in relative industrial harmony. Trade unions registered and continued to exist 
within the new criteria, attempting where possible within the legislative constraints, to 
improve the conditions of their members. 
It is arguable that some trade unions were fom1ed precisely to take advantage of 
compulsory arbitration enforced by the state. 53 They took advantage of the ability to 
obtain a legally binding award under the system, regardless of their weakness as an 
52 Reeves State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand (Allen & Unwin, London, 1902) 
53 Peter Sheldon has argued that the dependence of the Australian unions upon the protections offered by 
the system for their recovery has been considerably overstated. See Sheldon Arbitration and Union Growth 
in Australia: A Historical Re-evaluation University of Auckland, 1993) 315-331 . It has been noted with 
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organisation, and of their capacity, or lack thereof, to threaten and sustain any 
consequential industrial action, such as a strike. The effect of this legislation was to 
withdraw the ultimate ability to settle a dispute from the disputants, and instead to place it 
in the hands of the Arbitration Court, an organ of the State. This meant that the IC&AA 
compensated for the bargaining weakness that resulted from unorganised or poorly 
organised workers in protecting their own wage rates.
54 
Unions could therefore provide adequate Award cover to their members , by virtue of 
being registered, without actually requiring the individual strength to personally demand 
such conditions from individual employers. As a result, several unions developed as 
"placid bureaucratic institutions, content to nestle safely within the arbitration system and 
to receive gratefully such benefits as it conferred on their members."
55 They remained in 
existence as small organisations, with limited financial resources and ability, restricted to 
representing their members on a narrow range of issues within the narrow parameters 
allowed by the system. 
Unregistered trade unions could operate as unions with members, but they were not 
protected or assisted by the provisions of the statute, 
56 and could not be a party to the 
conciliation or arbitration processes. Members of unregistered unions fell outside the 
jurisdiction of the Award and Industrial Agreements blanket provisions for the applicable 
industry or occupation. 
Trade unions remained in a somewhat weakened position, and there were no strikes from 
1894 until 1906, facts regarded simultaneously as both indicative of the benefits of the 
legislation, and of its detriments. Ramsey MacDonald, a British Labour leader suggested 
that "a trade union in New Zealand exists mainly to get an Award out of the Arbitration 
Court", and his American counterpart, VS Clark, accused trade unions of being "litigious 
interest that New Zealand has never mounted a similar argument: Nolan and Walsh Labour's Leg-Iron? 
Assessing Trade Unions and Arbitration in New Zealand (Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, 1994) 
54 Gross The Condition of New Zealand Unions - an Environmental Approach 1961) 30. 
55 Nolan and Walsh Labour's Leg-Iron? Assessing Trade Unions and Arbitration in New Zealand 
(Dunmore Press , Palmerston North , 1994) 16. 
56 See JV(A)(5) . 
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rather than militant organisations, the creatures and instruments of state regulations."
57 
By this stage however unions' strength had recovered somewhat, and the stronger unions 
were increasingly less dependant on the IC&AA. 
The success of the Blackball strikers in 1908
58 rejuvenated the union movement. The 
leaders of the strike were among the inaugural members of the Federation of Miners. The 
Federation did not register under the IC&AA. The Federation changed its name in 1909 
to the New Zealand Federation of Labor
59
, and members soon became known as the 'Red 
Feds'. The Red Feds built up a substantial membership with their preaching of 
uncompromising conflict and strength. "The working class and the employing class have 
nothing in common ... Between these two classes a struggle must go on unti I the workers 
of the world organise as a class, take possession of the earth and the machinery of 
production, and abolish the wage system."
60 
The outbreak of World War I intensified the problems of combining for trade unions, as 
well as exacerbating the shortage of labour. "Except amongst the few irreconcilables, 
militancy crumbled before the pressure of patriotism aroused during the First World War. 
The war united, where the Federation sought to divide. The cry of 'country not class ' 
d . . "bl ,,6 1 prove 1rres1st1 e. 
The inter-war years saw the increased industrial power of employers. The IC&AA was 
amended in 1932 so that arbitration was available only when both unions and employers 
57 Clark The Labour Movement in Australasia (Constable & Co, London, 1907) 64. 
58 Miners from the Blackball Mine on the West Coast struck over their demands for a 30 minute lunch 
break - they had been allowed a mere 15 minutes . The strike lasted a full three months before the 
employers relented and reinstated the miners, and 30 minutes for lunch. The strike received strong support 
throughout the country, even despite the union being prosecuted and fined in the Arbitration Court for 
striking. 
The ringleader of the strike, Pat Hickey, later recounted that when the matter went to court reference was 
made to the allowance of 15 minutes for lunch being far too short. The judge " remarked with a frown that 
he thought 15 minutes ample time. He then glanced at the clock, noticed the time was 12:30 and stated the 
Court stood adjourned for lunch until 2pm." Hickey Red Fed Memoirs (Wellington Media Collective, 
Wellington, 1980) 12 
59 "Labor" was deliberately spelt in the American fashion. 
60 Hickey Red Fed Memoirs (Wellington Media Collective, Wellington, 1980) 17. These sentences occur 
in the Preamble of the American Industrial Workers of the World (as amended in 1908) which the New 
Zealand Federation of Labor adopted as its own Preamble in 1912. 
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agreed62 in reaction to the problems of employment during the Depression. The 
Depression created for the first time in New Zealand a situation of overproduction of 
goods, and oversupply of labour. The high rates of unemployment resulted in the 
widespread rejection of arbitration by employers who could impose their preferred 
conditions on unions. 
All these factors contributed to the election of a Labour Government in 1935. The new 
Government introduced compulsory unionism almost immediately. Seen as a benefit to 
unions and their members, the Labour Government maintained that their rationale behind 
this move was that it was inappropriate and unfair for non-members of unions to benefit 
from the improved conditions and rates of pay gained through union membership without 
contributing to the unions. 
In April 193 7 the New Zealand Federation of Labour ("FOL") was established with the 
help of the Government. This body, significant for its role in uniting the trade union 
movement, lasted for 50 years until it merged in 1987 with the Combined State Unions to 
form the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions. 
The power to deregister a union, as a penalty for striking was first conferred on the 
Minister of Labour by the IC&A Amendment Act 1939. Deregistration denied the 
deregistered union access to the Arbitration Court as well as awards. It could also involve 
the seizure of the union's funds. This draconian power was invoked infrequently - most 
notably following the 1951 waterfront strike where six unions were deregistered. It was 
only in 1987, with the advent of the Labour Relations Act, that this power was revoked.63 
Until the Second World War, award rates of pay and actual rates of pay were usually 
similar. National awards set the wages for most employees, and above award payments 
61 Stone The Unions and the Arbitration System, 1900-1937 (Paul's Book Arcade, Auckland, 1963) 207 
62 Women were not covered under this amendment. 
63 
Peter Brosnan, David F Smith and Pat Walsh , The Dynamics of New Zealand Industrial Relations (John 
Wiley & Sons, Auckland, 1990) 
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negotiated on an individual industry basis were rare.
64 This began to change after the 
War, where increasingly unions would negotiate above-award payments with their 
employers. The practice was encouraged by the generally buoyant economic condition
s at 
the time, and gathered momentum during the 1960s, in part due to a commonly held 
belief that the Arbitration Court had adopted an unreasonably conservative approach t
o 
wage rates. The result was that over the following decade, real wages did not match th
e 
rise in the Gross Domestic Product ("GDP").
65 
The failure ofreal wages to keep pace with the rise in real GDP, coupled with the 
growing willingness of unions to push their claims outside the formal machinery of 
conciliation and arbitration, and the abundance of labour shortages inevitably created 
an 
environment where it was possible for a rapid rise in wages to occur, given the necess
ary 
trigger. The trigger was not long in coming. 
The 1968 wage dispute
66 can be seen from a trade union perspective as the climax of a 
process that spanned the 1950s and 1960s, and was the final nail in compulsory 
arbitration's coffin. New Zealand had developed a system of dispute resolution during
 
this period that made use of the formal entrenched system of conciliation and arbitrati
on 
as a means of obtaining basic wages and conditions, and the use of an informal, non-
legislated system of collective bargaining to obtain actual wage rates and conditions. T
his 
two-tier system worked particularly well for those strong unions capable of negotiatin
g 
directly with employers. The weaker unions that were not so well organised relied on
 the 
third tier of this system, the General Wage Order, to ensure the wages of their membe
rs 
kept pace with the cost of living. 
64 Prichard An Economic History of New Zealand to 1939 (Collins, Auckland, 1970) 
65 From March 1959 to March 1969 the real average weekly earnings of adult males 
grew at an annual 
average rate of about 1.5% while the real GDP per head rose on average by 2% pe
r year. Over the ten year 
period, therefore, real GDP per head increased 24%, some 7% more than the grow
th in real average weekly 
wages. This was despite the fact that ruling rates moved substantially ahead of awa
rd rates during this 
period. Boston incomes Policy in New Zealand (Victoria University Press, Wellingt
on, 1984) 90, Council 
inflation Report (New Zealand Monetary and Economic Council, Wellington, 1977)
 32 
66 Wilson Recent Developments in New Zealand's industrial Relations System 1981) 3
5 . 
Page 33 
N EW Z EALAND AND THE JLO C ONVENTIONS 87 & 98 
The fact that trade unions could negotiate directly with the employer, and have some 
success at it, reflected the increase in strength and organisation of the trade union 
movement. It also revealed to the government that it was no longer possible to rely 
completely on the Arbitration Court to control wage increases. This was of concern to a 
government that was facing increasing inflation. Its answer was to enact several pieces of 
legislation over the next decade in an attempt to counter and control increases in 
remuneration that were made outside of the Arbitration Court. Among the first of these 
statutes were the General Wage Ord.ers Act 196967 and the Stabilisation of Remuneration 
Act 1971.68 
The success of these attempts by government is "a question for an economist"69 . What is 
evident is the gradual but persistent breakdown of the traditional method of industrial 
dispute resolution. By the 1960s the notion of compulsory arbitration in dispute 
settlement had become a fallacy . 
Control over wage rates was increasingly in the hands of individual employers and local 
union officials, as the wage-fixing system grew increasingly fragmented. The FOL and 
the Employers' Federation "could do little other than watch idly as wage rates escalated 
in an unprecedented manner and the number of working days lost through industrial 
stoppages reached their highest level since the 1951 waterfront strike." 70 
(b) The Industrial Relations Act 1973 
67 This statute was based on an agreement reached between the employers ' and workers' federations, and 
regulated the procedure for issuing any orders . Under the Act, changes in the cost of living were to be 
among the first criteria that the Court was required to take into account. 
68 This legislation was followed by the Stabilisation of Remuneration Regulations 1972, and then by the 
Wage Adjustment Regulations 1974, which remained in place until the advent of the ECA 1991 , although 
the provisions relating the direct control of increases in remuneration were repealed in 1977. The measures 
undertaken by all three legislative bodies took the same form: a special tribunal was established with the 
responsibility of approving all increases in remuneration contained in an instrument. The tribunal also had 
jurisdiction to in most instances to make General Wage Orders, which became known as cost of living 
orders. The criteria for approval of increases in both types of orders were set out in the legislation. 
69 Wilson Recent Developments in New Zealand's Industrial Relations System 1981) 37. 
70 Boston Incomes Policy in New Zealand (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1984) 93. See also tables 
- industrial stoppages in New Zealand 
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By the early 1970s New Zealand was once more experiencing a significant, if generally 
unexpected, acceleration in wage inflation. This trend coincided with an upsurge in the 
level of industrial unrest, and workers displaying a greater willingness to exploit their 
market power to obtain substantial real-wage gains than they had shown in the previous 
two decades. 71 
The Industrial Relations Act ("IRA") came into effect on 8 March 1984, ending 80 years 
oflC&AA rule. Despite the change in name from previous legislation, however, this Act 
constituted little more than a continuance of "compulsory conciliation and arbitration and 
the careful regulation of unions observed in New Zealand since 1894."
72 It continued the 
IC&AA system of wage determination, and reaffirmed the importance of formal award 
negotiations, and applied only to the Private Sector. 
4 The Public Sector 
Unionism in the Public Sector can be traced as far back as the establishment of the New 
Zealand Educational Institute in 1883. Not originally intended to deal with industrial 
matters, it later became union conscious with the aim to uphold and maintain the just 
claims of its members. It was soon joined by the Amalgamated Society of Railway 
Servants in 1886 and the Post and Telegraph Officers' Society in 1890. The Public 
Service Association was also formed in 1890 but collapsed within a few years having 
failed to achieve sufficient recruitment. 
It is sufficient for the purposes of this paper to discuss the existence of trade unions in the 
Public Sector prior to the State Sector Act 1988 very briefly. JF Robertson 
comprehensively deals with this in his text, Legislation and Industrial Relations in the 
Public Sector. 73 
71 Boston, above n70, 89. 
72 Brooks The Practice of Industrial Relations in New Zealand (Commerce Clearing House, Auckland, 
1978) 13 
73 Robertson Legislation and industrial Relations in the Public Sector (Pitman Australia, 1974) 
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The service organisations operating prior to these changes under the LRA and State 
Sector Act 1988 were, in general, larger than their private sector counterparts, averaging 
7,400 members as compared with 2,100 members. At the time of the introduction of the 
new laws, two very large service organisations dominated public sector unionism: the 
PSA covering 69,700 members and the Post Office Union covering 38,000 members. 74 
Public Sector unions, or "service organisations" as they were known, were not required to 
be registered until the State Sector Act 1988 and were not, with the exception of the 
postal/ telecommunications and railways unions, subject to the compulsory unionism 
provisions that existed from time to time for the private sector. Nevertheless, unionism 
prospered in the public sector and membership levels were high. The vertical spread of 
membership encompassed all levels of employees, including the most senior levels of the 
organisations. This situation changed in 1988 when the State Sector Act put state sector 
unions under the same provisions as the LRA and effectively allowed compulsory 
unionism for the public sector for the first time. However, many public sector unions 
elected not to adopt the system. The LRA provisions did not oblige public sector unions 
to have a union membership clause,75 but for the first time since the State Sector 
Conditions of Employment Act 1977 provided them with that opportunity. 
5 The Labour Relations Act 1987 
The Labour Relations Act ("LRA") constituted a substantial departure from the previous 
regime. The impetus behind the legislation was a desire to create unions that were viable 
and not dependent on subsidies or other legislative props. A 1989 Department of Labour 
paper reaffirmed this intention: 76 
The objective of the Labour Relations Act 1987 is to facilitate the formation of effective 
union and employer organisations which will be capable of negotiating awards and 
74 
Paper Industrial Relations: A Framework/or Review (Department of Labour, Wellington, 1985) 4. 
75 Similar to the preference clause in the private sector. 
Page 36 
0 
NEW ZEALAND AND THE !LO CONVENTIONS 87 & 98 
agreements relevant to the conditions in the industry or workplace concerned. 
Participants in the industrial relations system are therefore encourage to conduct their 
affairs independently of legislative support. 
At the same time, the Act recognises that certain minimum levels of protection should be 
in place in order to ensure that society's preferences for equity are maintained .. .lt is 
however, the responsibility of unions to negotiate remuneration and conditions of 
employment above the statutory minimums and to protect the rights of employees 
through the statutory procedures provided. 
The new legislation created the potential for making agreements outside the national 
award system. Unions were now able to cite an employer to opt out of a national award 
~here they wished to negotiate a separate agreement - the new agreement would then be 
binding on the parties. There was no corresponding provision for employers to opt out of 
the awards system.77 This created flexibility for the unions within the negotiating 
framework, without the associated risk of employers opting out of awards as desired and 
enforcing oppressive conditions on the workers. The draconian ability for the Minister of 
Labour to deregister unions as penalty for striking was finally removed. 
6 Registration 
Registration was a central feature of the IC&AA, IRA and LRA. It bestowed upon the 
union three primary rights: the right to organise a specific category of workers; to be 
recognised as representatives of their members for bargaining purposes; and the right of 
access to compulsory conciliation and arbitration mechanisms to determine and enforce 
the settlement of industrial disputes on recalcitrant employers. The conferment of 
corporate status following registration is significant from a legal perspective in that it 
76 Labour Submission to the Commission of Inquiry into Industrial Democracy (Department of Labour, 
Wellington, 1989) I 
77 Provision was made for employers to opt out of awards in certain limited circumstances following the 
Labour Relations Amendment Act 1990. 
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granted trade unions legitimacy under the law, but is unlikely to have been seen as a 
major incentive by non-legal union members and officials. 
7 Membership 
Under the IC&AA any group of seven workers78 in a trade could form a union and apply 
for registration. The membership requirement went largely unaltered until the passage of 
the LRA, which required I ,OOO workers as the membership criteria for registration. Any 
group of I ,OOO workers could register under the new Act regardless of whether or not 
they were already a society. This constituted a substantial departure from the IRA the 
group applicant was required to already be a society, associated for the purpose of 
furthering the interests of workers in any specified industry or related industries 79 . It also 
facilitated a continuing trend toward fewer trade unions, as the same union could 
represent more workers, and classes of workers. 
Public sector unions, commonly referred to as "service organisations", operating outside 
the industrial relations legislation (prior to the changes under the LRA and the 
introduction of the State Sector Act 1988) were, in general, larger than their private sector 
counterparts, averaging 7,400 members as compared with 2,100 members. At the time of 
the introduction of the new laws, two very large service organisations dominated public 
sector unionism: the PSA covering 69,700 members and the Post Office Union covering 
38,000 members. 80 
They were not required to register as trade unions until 1988 and were not, with the 
exception of the postal/ telecommunications and railways unions, subject to the 
compulsory unionism provisions that existed from time to time for the private sector. 
Nevertheless, unionism prospered in the public sector and membership levels were high. 
The vertical spread of membership encompassed all levels of employees, including the 
78 This figure was lowered to five, and then increased to 15 during the course of the IC&AA regime. 
79 IRA 1973, sl63. 
80 Paper Industrial Relations: A Framework/or Review (Department of Labour, Wellington, 1985) 4. 
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most senior levels of the organisations. This changed in 1988 when the State Sector Act 
put state sector unions under the same provisions as the LRA and effectively introduced 
compulsory unionism for the public sector for the first time. Union membership clauses 
were not obligatory under the LRA, but for the first time since the State Sector 
Conditions of Employment Act 1977 public sector were given the opportunity. 
One of the disadvantages of union membership guaranteed by law is that it removed one 
of the most important tasks of active leadership on the part of union officials: attracting 
and holding members by convincing them of the benefits of belonging. Under this 
system, the argument has been presented that the only clear reason members had for 
b~longing to a union was because the law compelled them to .81 
Exemption from union membership criteria was available on the satisfaction of s83 LRA, 
if they objected "on the grounds of conscience or other deeply held personal conviction". 
Religion was the most common reason for objection under the IC&AA and IRA -
religious beliefs were the only justification under the IC&AA - but the LRA, did not 
actually refer to such beliefs. 
The major growth area for unions since the Second World War was in "white collar"· 
unions, due predominantly to two things. The first was the tremendous growth in the 
number of white-collar jobs and the increased proportion of these jobs to the total number 
of jobs in New Zealand; and the second was the increased proportion of people in white-
collar jobs who began to join unions. 
The award system that operated under compulsory arbitration was designed for blue-
collar workers and not their white-collar counterparts. The intention behind the award 
system was to provide minimum conditions and wages applicable to all workers within 
the industry concerned. However, the system included a cut-off point in salaries for 
clerical awards, and the award did not apply to any salaries that fell above the cut-off 
point. Therefore, many clerical workers were not covered by the award scheme because 
81 Gross, above n55 , 32. 
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they earned more than what was allowed by the system. This effectively denied many 
senior level clerical workers any direct award coverage or protection. Indirectly, 
however, clerical workers received protection from the very fact that their conditions 
were usually above the award level. 
The impact of the " 1,000 member rule" under the LRA was extreme. The dramatic 
changes in number and size of unions were brought about as the smaller unions had little 
choice but to amalgamate in order to survive. The number of trade unions continued to 
decline between September 1989 and May 1991 , reaching 80 at the latter date, with the 
introduction of the Employment Contracts Act. 
8 !LO Compliance 
The signing of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I signalled the 
beginnings of an international awareness of the plight of workers, and an understanding 
that international peace was not attainable until there was universal social justice. In turn, 
social justice could only exist where there were fair conditions of labour, and where 
workers were treated with respect and dignity. The establishment of the ILO at this 
juncture put these objectives into motion, but it was not until the close of World War II 
that the ILO began its 'active duty' as a crusader on behalf of workers' rights . 
In 1946, after World War II had ended, the ILO adopted the 1944 Declaration of 
Philadelphia into its Constitution, thus reaffirming the freedom of association as one of 
the fundamental principles on which the ILO was based, and characterised it as "essential 
to sustained progress". Two years later, Convention 87, the Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise, 1948, was adopted by the ILO. Convention 98, the 
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, was adopted the following 
year. New Zealand did not ratify either or these Conventions at the time, as the country's 
labour laws made it ineligible to do so. Compulsory arbitration and monopoly negotiation 
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rights as existed under the IC&AA 82 did not fit with the criteria set out by the ILO in 
these Conventions. Nor, for that matter, did the Government's ability to deregister unions 
from 193 7 to 1987. 83 This power was a direct contravention of the ILO' s stance that 
unions (both workers' and employers') should be able to exist independently of the State , 
and especially that the State had no power threaten, coerce or, in the case of New 
Zealand, deregister, a union. 84 The ability to deregister a union was especially effective as 
a means of controlling unions during the periods of compulsory unionism from 1936 
onwards. 
Similarly, Convention 87 holds that unions shall the right to "establish and join 
federations and confederations and any such organisation, federation or confederation 
shall have the right to affiliate with international organisations of workers and 
employers."85 New Zealand could not ratify this Convention under the IC&AA because 
until the 1936 amendment to the IC&AA,
86 the Registrar of trade unions was prohibited 
from registering a union on a national or multi-district basis. This had the effect of 
treating different branches of the same union as separate entities, and effectively split the 
union movement by removing the ability for unions which were previously multi-district 
or national to maintain any degree of consistency among the branches. 
87 
The Industrial Relations Act that came into being in 1984 replaced the IC&AA but 
constituted little more than a continuance of "compulsory conciliation and arbitration and 
the careful regulation of unions observed in New Zealand since 1894."
88 It continued the 
IC&AA system of wage determination, and reaffirmed the importance of formal award 
negotiations, and applied only to the Private Sector. Accordingly, New Zealand's chosen 
legislation left the country failing to meet the criteria set for ratification of Conventions 
87 and 98. This was mainly due to the protected position given to unions (both workers' 
82 See below, IV(A)(5) & (6). 
83 See above, IV(A)(3)(a). 
84 Convention 87, Article 4: "workers' and employers' organisations shall not be liable to be dissolved or 
suspended by administrative authority." 
85 Article 5 
86 Introduced and passed by New Zealand's first Labour Government. 
87 Roth, above n42, 20. 
88 Brooks, above n72, 13. 
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and employers' organisations) under the industrial conciliation and arbitration system that 
continued under the IRA. The then Minister of Labour (Hon J. Bolger) told the ILO in 
1983 that "because of the protective nature of our industrial Jaw New Zealand has yet to 
ratify the Freedom of Association Convention". 89 
It has been noted that New Zealand's official approach to ratifying ILO conventions is 
that "because of the obligations incumbent on ratifying countries, New Zealand ratifies a 
convention only when there is strict compliance of law and practice with all the 
provisions of the particular Convention".90 Under this approach it is difficult for member 
states to ensure total compliance for the implementation of a convention by voluntary 
procedures, such as with collective bargaining. However, it is also inconsistent with a 
system of collective bargaining for the government to dictate the terms of a collective 
agreement, as the New Zealand Government was able to do under the IC&AA, the IRA 
and the LRA respectively. The New Zealand Government expressed these sentiments 
accordingly: 91 
we believe that this particular matter is one in which cooperation from employers· and 
workers' organisations cannot be enforced, but is to be given voluntarily, and therefore 
cannot be ensured through legislative or other directive measures. 
Consequently, it is likely that New Zealand will ratify only technical conventions as they 
can be implemented by government action alone, and require no outside assistance. 
Following the above quote, it would appear that New Zealand would feel unable to ratify 
any conventions requiring tripartite cooperation, unless universal agreement could be 
achieved.92 Using this line of argument, New Zealand was patently against ratifying 
either Conventions 87 or 98 under the IC&AA, the IRA or the LRA because both 
conventions have broad applications and would affect New Zealand's domestic industrial 
relations system generally. They would also require tripartite cooperation for the 
89 AJHR 19 Paper A7, 8. 
90 
Gordon Anderson, "International Labour Standards and the Review of Industrial Law" 11(1) NZJIR, 27, 
28. 
91 AJHR 1975, Paper A 7 A, 4. 
92 Anderson, above n90, 29. 
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objectives to be fulfilled, something the New Zealand Government seemed at pains to 
avoid. 
By 1990, trade unions had endured a century of immense legislative coercion and 
dramatic social, economic and political unrest. Trade unions seemed at last to have access 
to a system of collective bargaining under the LRA that removed the direct participation 
of the government in wage and condition negotiations, and enabled stronger unions to 
utilise their industrial strength for its intended purpose - to facilitate better negotiations 
and improved conditions. Little did they realise in 1990 how dramatically the industrial 
relations arena was to change with the advent of the Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
Within twelve short months, all legislative reference to trade unions would be eradicated. 
The concept of individually negotiated contracts and individual bargaining between 
employer and employee would be paramount in a de-regulated labour market. Under the 
Employment Contracts Act trade unions were to be ousted from the industrial relations 
environment in which they been an integral part for the past 150 years in New Zealand. 
What chance would trade unions stand to exist in this hostile new environment? 
B The Employment Contracts Act 
Compared with its predecessors, the Employment Contracts Act has remarkably little to 
say about the issue of collective bargaining. Part I of the Act simply provides for freedom 
of association and gives employees the right to associate or not to associate with other 
employees for the purpose of advancing their collective employment interests. 
Membership of any employees' organisation is entirely voluntary, and discrimination in 
employment matters on the grounds of membership or non-membership of an employees' 
organisation is prohibited . There is no doubt that the Employment Contracts Act has both 
empowered and disempowered workers. It has empowered them individually, but 
disempowered them collectively. 93 
93 Ellen J Dannin, Working Free: the Impact and implications of the Employment Contracts Act in New 
Zealand, (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1997) 169. 
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Whilst the ECA acknowledges freedom of association and collective bargaining, and 
promotes freedom of association as an object of the Act, it fails to give true effect to that 
freedom. The "freedom of association" embodied in Part I of the Act is not the traditional 
protection or collective action but a freedom to disassociate.94 
The ECA, as discussed in an earlier chapter, is founded on a liberal theory of contract, as 
suggested by the "New Right" ideology. This ideology endorses an idealised concept of 
freedom of association that is not realistically attainable or enforceable under the Act. It 
denies that there is unequal bargaining power between the parties to an employment 
contract and that this power imbalance can and is used by the stronger party (in all but 
very rare exceptions, the employer), to influence the negotiations. Thus, the "central 
failure of the ECA rests in the fact that conferring the right to freedom of association has 
little or no value unless employees have sufficient power to make use of this freedom."95 
The result of such treatment is that the employee in reality may not have the choice to 
join a collective employment contract when the employer is only prepared to offer an 
individual contract. By denying that the imbalance in bargaining power exists, the ECA 
can provide no means by which to remedy it. 
New Zealand is the only member State of the ILO, with the exception of the USA, which 
has ratified neither Convention 87, the Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise Convention, nor Convention 98 , the Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining Convention. It was unable to ratify these Conventions whilst the industrial 
conciliation and arbitration system was in force in New Zealand, because compulsory 
union membership and monopoly bargaining rights are contrary to the principles of the 
freedom of association as set out in Convention 87.96 
1 Freedom of Association 
Freedom of association is of paramount importance to New Zealand industrial relations, 
particularly under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 . This section will discuss how the 
94 
Peter Churchman & Walter Grills, "Employment Contracts Act Revisited" , (1992) 4. 
95 
Anne Boyd, "The Freedom of Association in the Employment Contracts Act 1991 : What Has it Meant for 
Trade Unions and the Process of Collective Bargaining in New Zealand?" (1997) 28 Cal W Int ' I LJ 65 , 65 . 
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freedom of association is regarded in New Zealand, and the obstacles it has encountered 
in the New Zealand legislative and judicial arenas. 
Freedom of association is of pivotal importance to the ECA. The Act lists the promotion 
of freedom of association as one of its objects, second only to the promotion of an 
"efficient labour market."97 Part I of the Act is entirely concerned with the freedom to 
join or not join a union. It forbids the use of undue influence or any tactics that could 
result in the avoidance of freedom of choice, or in attempts to influence that choice. 98 
Part II of the Act is concerned with collective bargaining, but this is closely bound up 
with freedom of association. Freedom of association in an industrial context is not 
important in its own right, but only in the sense that it enables collective bargaining to 
occur. 99 To that end, section 12, which establishes the authority for a union to represent 
its members in negotiations, and the duty for an employer to recognise that authority 
(although there is no correlating duty to bargain with the representative) gives effect to 
the right to freedom of association. 
The definition of freedom of association under the ECA creates a problem for its 
enforcement. The BORA also contains a definition for freedom of association, which is 
somewhat narrower and more restrictive than the definition afforded in the ECA. The 
BORA that is set out in s 17 declares, "everyone has the right to freedom of association". 
It focuses on civil and political rights, public rights that are bestowed by the state to 
maintain democratic order, and that contain no affirmative action. Thus, freedom of 
association in the context of the BORA is merely the right for individuals to assemble. 
Conversely, freedom of association in a labour law context has much more expansive 
definitions, particularly those set down by the various international human rights 
instruments. It requires affirmative action in the promotion of freedom of association and 
96 Anderson, above n90. 
97 List of subsidiary objects, ECA 1991 . 
98 ss5, 8 ECA 1991 
99 Boyd, above n95, 68. 
Page 45 
NEW ZEALAND AND THE ILO CONVENTIONS 87 & 98 
collective bargaining. Justice Dickson asserted that "there is a clear consensus amongst 
the ILO adjudicative bodies that Convention 87 goes beyond merely protecting the 
formation oflabour unions and provides protection of their essential activities - that is of 
collective bargaining and the right to strike."100 
The problem of which definition is more appropriate for an employment context is not 
however unsolvable. Anne Boyd argues that the BORA standard is an unsuitable means 
of defining the freedom of association for three reasons: 101 the retention of a specialist 
employment jurisdiction under the ECA supports the notion that the employment 
relationship is incapable of being governed by ordinary principles of law. Freedom of 
association in relation to labour Jaw therefore would be best defined in an employment 
law context. Secondly, the BORA definition defeats the purpose of Parts l and II of the 
ECA. Part I of the ECA confers the right of freedom of association, and Part II provides 
the machinery needed to use the freedom effectively through collective bargaining. Part 
II of the Act cannot be properly utilised under a BORA definition. Finally, freedom of 
association should be given a purposive definition, as asserted by Justice Dickson in the 
dissenting judgment in Re Public Service Employee Relations A et, where he declared that 
"[ w]hile it is vital to protect the ability to form, join and maintain unions, unless workers 
are also protected in their pursuance of the objects for which they have associated , the 
freedom is meaningless". 102 Justice Gault echoed these sentiments in £ketone v Affiance 
Textiles (NZ) LTD where he held that "freedom of association is, of course, much broader 
than the rights to join or not join a trade union ... It is not open to the Courts to depart 
from the plain meaning of the words of the statute but where it can be done (and the .Bill 
of Rights requires it) the stature is to be given meaning consistent with the freedom of 
association as internationally recognised." 103 
100 
R Doyle, The Industrial/Political Dichotomy: The Impact of Freedom of Communication Cases on 
Industrial Law ( 1995) 8 AJLR 91 , I 00 citing RE Public Service Employ ee Relations Act [ 1987] I SCR 31 3, 
355 . 
101 Boyd, above n95, 68 
102 Above, nlOO, 355. 
103 [1993] 2 ERNZ 783, 795 
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Article 11 of Convention 87 requires the government to "take all necessary and 
appropriate measures to ensure that workers ... may freely exercise the right to organise." 
Thus, the Article not only confers the right to organise, but requires positive intervention 
for the promotion and protection of this right. The ECA does not promote the positive 
right to organise, merely allows the right to exist. The Hon. Bill Birch, the Labour 
Minister at the time, argued that the ECA does conform to Article 11 because it gives 
workers the freedom to choose whether they want to organise, and in what form. 104 He 
referred to the Court of Appeal's interpretation of the Act as "union neutral" in United 
Food and Chemical Workers Union of New Zealand v Talley 105 to support his arguments. 
The Minister however incorrectly assumed that neutrality was equivalent to taking "all 
necessary and appropriate measures". The latter requires positive intervention in support 
of the freedom of association, and clearly the ECA does not conform to Convention 87 in 
this regard. 
2 Collective Bargaining 
(a) The New Bargaining Framework 
The objective of the Employment Contracts Act 1991, as stated in its Long Title, is to 
promote efficiency in the labour market. Clearly, it is economic efficiency that is being 
promoted by the Act, as will be evidenced from the following discussion of the ECA. 
Other objectives stated in the Long Title are: to ensure the protection of the rights of 
individual workers and employers to be represented by the bargaining agent of their 
choice, to decide on the bargaining structure that best suits them , and to determine the 
scope of their agreements themselves. Thus, it is clear from the outset that the ECA 
constitutes a radical rejection of the collectivist tradition of New Zealand labour relations 
in favour of an individualistic one. 106 
104 G Anderson, Hon W Birch, Correspondence, ( 1992) Indus L Bull 7-9 
105 [1993] I ERNZ 360 
106 Anderson, above n90. 
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Under the Act, individuals are seen as holding equal power as their employers, and 
possessing the freedom of choice between negotiating individual employment contracts 
or collective employment contracts. The employer is given exactly the same freedom. 
The choice of contract then becomes an issue of relative power, and the critical issue, 
given that the bargaining advantage favours the employers by virtue of their superior 
economic power, is whether the ECA provides the support required to ensure that the 
employees are able to exercise fully the choices provided to them, and in particular the 
choice to bargain collectively through a union and to enter into collective contracts. It 
would seem obvious therefore that the freedom exercised in such negotiations is more 
likely not to be the freedom of choice of those party to the negotiations, but the freedom 
of choice of the party holding the greatest bargaining power, invariably the employer. 
Trade unions have no recognised legal status under the ECA, and are given a subordinate, 
largely unprotected role in bargaining as "employee organisations" under the Act. 
The ECA's freedom of choice and association makes it difficult to resolve issues of 
representation. Employees have freedom only if they can freely designate their 
representative. Employers can only have freedom of choice and association if they are not 
forced to bargain with a representative. Yet if the employer can ignore the employee's 
choice, the employee's choice is meaningless. 
The ECA's language gives the same rights to authorise a representative or not and to 
bargain or not equally to employers and employees. "The reason this does not meet the 
test of reality is that the theory ignored the context in which bargaining would occur. That 
context meant that paper equality was real inequality." 107 Workers are more likely to 
want to bargain with the employer's representative, because it is the only way to get the 
changes they want. In all but extreme labour shortages, the employer's power over the 
workplace allows it to force employees to accede its wishes, whether it bargains or not. 
Carol Shaw of Air New Zealand Workers explained what the ECA meant to an individual 
worker: 108 
'
07 Dannin, above n93 , 195 . 
108 
Rebecca Macfie, "Air New Zealand Employs Vintage Approach", NBR, 04 October 1991 , 3. 
Page 48 
Jt 
1t 
tl 
NEW Z EALAND AND THE ILO CONVENTIONS 87 & 98 
It's all very well for a member of a major union to say "no, l won ' t accept that , it 's 
wrong, unfair or unjust", and to say that with some confidence, or to not even have to say 
it directly to the employer but through his agent. But now we ' re in a situation where 
workers are without their strong union backing, and are face-to-face eyeballing the 
employer. Suddenly the balance of power is weighted very much in favour of the 
employer. 
Section 9 sets out the objects for Part II of the Act, the bargaining provisions. The object 
is twofold. First, an employee or employer may conduct negotiations for an employment 
contract on their own, or may choose to be represented by another person, group or 
organisation. Secondly, two types of bargaining outcomes are available - individual 
employment contracts, and collective employment contracts, with the type of contract 
and its contents being a matter for negotiation in each case. 
(i) Representation 
s 10( 1) enables each party to the negotiations for an employment contract to determine 
whether they want to be represented by another person, group or organisation, and if so, 
who will represent them. 109 
A bargaining agent who has successfully negotiated an agreement on behalf of an 
individual or group will not automatically become a party to the contract as they would 
have under previous New Zealand law. They will do so only if both the employer and 
employees to the contract agree. In some cases it may be desirable for this to occur in 
order to simplify the process of contract enforcement, but the requirement for the both 
parties to agree before a representative may become a party to the agreement effectively 
gives the employer the ability to veto the employee's desire to have their representative 
party to the agreement, if the employer so desires. 
109 s 11 ECA 1991 constitutes a minor exclusion clause to this section, and allows the employer to object to 
the choice ofrepresentative, if the representative has been convicted of an offence punishable by a term of 
imprisonment of five years or greater. Commonly known as the "Black Power" rule, the exception exists 
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The authority to represent is dealt with in s I 2. This section is crucial to the 
implementation and practice of the ECA. A representative claiming to have the authority 
to represent any party to employment negotiations must establish that they possess the 
authority to represent the particular party in negotiations. The ECA does not specify how 
this is to be done, written authority is not strictly required, and many unions have 
amended their rules so that membership is deemed to constitute authorisation to 
· 110 negotiate. 
The only provision within the ECA that placed any, albeit very little, obligation on the 
employer to respect the employee's choice of bargaining representative was section 
I 2(2), which provided that the employer shall "recognise the authority of that 
[representative) to represent the employee .. .in those negotiations." Section 12(2) became 
the critical legal support for collective bargaining under the ECA by default, because 
although an employer was required to recognise the employee's authorised representative 
or union, they were not obligated to negotiate with said representative or trade union. 
never mind to do so in good faith! 
Real and effective employee choice is undercut by the ECA so that it is only illusory. As 
long as the employers have the power to refuse to bargain with an employee's designated 
representative and to frustrate the employee's efforts to be a partner in workplace 
governance, the worker is likely to direct frustration at the union and to walk out, force a 
schism and ultimately weaken all unions. 111 
(ii) Collective Employment Contracts 
Collective employment contracts ("CEC's") are defined in the ECA as being an 
employment contract that is binding on one or more employers and two or more 
primarily to prevent employees hiring gang members or the like to represent their interests in employment 
negotiations with the employer. 
110 John Deeks, Jane Parker, Rose Ryan, Labour and Employment Relations in New Zealand (Longman 
Paul, Auckland, 1994) 92. 
111 Dann in, above 1193, 283. 
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employees. 112 Employers can negotiate with the employees directly, or with the 
employee's representative, on their behalf. A CEC applies only to those who have signed 
it, and must be in writing. 113 It must be supplied to any worker covered by it if they 
request a copy, 114 and a copy must be sent to the Secretary of Labour if it covers twenty 
or more people. 115 There is no lodgement or registration requirement for CEC's covering 
fewer than twenty employees. Any amendments to the CEC can be included only if 
agreed to by all parties to the contract. Under section 21, the ECA allows new employees 
to be included in a current CEC if the original parties to the CEC agree. This 
accommodates for labour turnover without undue disruption. 
Finally, every CEC must include a specified expiry date. 116 When a CEC expires, an 
employee is covered by an individual employment contract ("IEC") that contains the 
terms and conditions of the expired CEC until a new CEC comes into force. It is illegal to 
strike during the currency of a CEC, or to strike over the issue of whether a CEC will 
cover more than one employer. 117 The ability for employees to strike under such 
conditions would dramatically increase the unions' pressure on employers to enter into 
multi-employer contracts. It was the Government's expectation that collective bargaining 
would decline and that individual employment contracts would replace much of the 
collective bargaining. Reliance on minimum legislative standards, as contained in the 
ECA, would have much greater importance in such an environrnent. 118 
(iii) Individual Employment Contracts 
Individual Employment contracts, by contrast to the CEC 's, are much more flexible and 
less rigid. It is an employment contract that is binding only on one employer and one 
employee, and is dealt with in section 19 of the Act. An individual contract can be oral or 
112 s20 ECA 1991. 
113 s20(4) ECA 1991. 
114 s20(5) ECA 1991. 
11 5 s24 ECA 1991. 
11 6 s22 ECA 1991. 
11 7s63( I )(a) ECA 1991. 
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in writing or a combination of both, and may consist of a mix of express, customary and 
implied terms. The ECA however requires that a copy of the IEC be put into writing and 
given to the employee if they request it at the time of negotiation.
119 Where there is an 
applicable CEC, each employer and employee may negotiate terms and conditions that 
are not inconsistent the terms and conditions of the CEC.
120 
(b) Conclusion 
3 Judicial Interpretation of Freedom of Association and Collective 
Bargaining under the ECA 
At the time of the Committee for Freedom of Association's decision concerning the ECA, 
a number of cases had been decided giving trade unions greater access to the workplace, 
and restricting employers ' attempts to bypass employees' authorised bargaining 
representatives. 
It was argued in Adams v Alliance Textiles (NZ) Limited
121 that the obligation to 
recognise a bargaining agent under section 12(2) involved a variety of duties. However 
the Court held that t he employer could engage in tactics designed to circumvent the 
authorised union and bargain directly with individual employees provided the conduct 
did not amount to duress or undue influence. If the employer used duress or undue 
influence, then their action could be challenged under section 8, which prohibits duress or 
undue influence in relation to union membership. A challenge could also be made under 
section 57, in which a contract obtained by harsh and oppressive behaviour or by undue 
influence or distress can be set aside. 
118 Raymond Harbridge, "Bargaining and the Employment Contracts Act: an Overview" in Raymond 
Harbridge (ed), Employment Contracts: New Zealand Experiences (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 
1993) 44. 
11 9 s19(5) ECA 1991. 
120 s 19(2) ECA 199 I. 
121 
[ 1992] 2ERNZ 982 
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The Court held that there was no exercise of undue influence or duress in the employer's 
actions. 122 It continued that, while an employer could not negotiate directly with an 
employee while an authority remained in place, it remained open for the employer to 
approach an employee directly to try and convince them to withdraw their authority. If 
the persuasion was successful and the pressure used was not undue, direct negotiations 
with the employee are held not to have breached section 12(2).
123 
The ECA drafters knew that letting employers choose whether to recognise their 
employee's agent would nullify workers' freedom of association and choice.
11
.i Despite 
this, they decided to allow the employer to "have the right to refuse to negotiate with any 
particular person or organisation or grouping of persons or organisations" and expected 
workers would then "change their choice of bargaining agent in order to gain agreement 
to negotiate and conclude a contract."
125 
The ECA's drafters accepted the idea that the employer could legitimately select its 
employees' representative,
126 because choosing a representative was nothing more than a 
cost-benefit analysis. They denied the workers had a legitimate right to be attached to 
their representative, and unwilling to change representatives to one "approved of' by the 
employer. As Joris de Bres, PSA president explained at the time: 
127 
We went to see the employer, said we were authorised to negotiate with you on a 
collective contract. They said, we don't want a collective contract. We recognise you as 
their representative, but we've got nothing to talk about, but we're perfectly happy for 
you to come along as the representative of each individual to assist in the negotiation of 
their individual contract. 
122 Adams, above nl05, 1039-1040. 
123 Adams, above n I 05 , I 024. 
124 Memorandum from JA Stockdill, General Manager, Industrial Relations Service, Department of Labour, 
& DJ Martin, Assistant Commissioner for the State Services Commission, to Minister of Labour and 
Minister of State Services, 29 November 1990, 4-5 , 9. 
125 Memorandum from JA Stockdill, General Manager, Industrial Relations Service, Department of Labour, 
to Bill Birch, Minister of Labour, 29 November 1990, 2. 
126 Patricia Greenfield and Robert Pleasure, "Representatives of Their Own Choosing: Finding Workers' 
Voice in the Legitimacy and Power of Their Unions", in Bruce Kaufman & Morris Kleiner (eds), Employee 
Representation: Alternatives and Future Directions, 1993 . 
127 Dannin, above n93 , 196 
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Adams v Alliance Textiles was appealed, 
128 and the Court of Appeal partially overruled 
the earlier decision. The Court held that whilst Part I of the Act allowed an employer to 
attempt to persuade its employees concerning union membership, once a union was 
authorised to represent an employee under Part II the employee's choice must be 
respected and given effect by the employer as required by section 12(2).
129 
To go behind the union ' s back does not seem consistent with recognising its authority. 
The contrary argument advanced for the employer here is that authority can be 
recognised by trying to persuade the giver of the authority to revoke it. That seems to me 
a rather cynical argument not in accord with the true intent, meaning and spirit of the 
enactment.. .Certainly an employer is free not to negotiate with anyone; but if he wishes 
to negotiate I doubt if he can bypass an authorised representative. 
The Court's recognition of the union's authority to negotiate on behalf of their members, 
and their direction that employers too must recognise the union's authority, appeared to 
signal the desire on the part of the Court to promote freedom of association in its broad 
sense. The Court continued with the assertion that once employees had joined a union, 
the employer was bound to respect that decision and recognise the authority of the union 
as bargaining representative. 
Justice Gault held that it was appropriate for the Court and the New Zealand judicial 
system to "have reference to the terms of, and decisions upon, international instruments 
dealing with fundamental rights when interpreting the scope of those rights under our Bill 
of Rights Act and other relevant legislation." 
130 He stated that, while the right to bargain 
collectively was not a necessary element of freedom of association, it is a right conferred 
by Part II of the Act and "should be fully accorded, bearing in mind ILO Convention 
98."131 
128 £ketone v Alliance Textiles (NZ) Ltd [ 1993] 2ERNZ 783 . 
129 £ketone, above n 128, 787 per Justice Cooke. 
130 Above nl03 at 795. 
13 1 £ketone, above nl28 , 794. 
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Cooke P and Gault J's decisions in £ketone appear to be an attempt by the Court of 
Appeal to bring New Zealand decisions in line with the international standards. It would 
be tempting to suggest that the Court in Eketone was preparing the way for future 
decisions to develop an implicit duty to bargain in good faith. However, although the 
judiciary took steps in this direction in Eketone and in the later Foodstujfs
132 case, they 
seemed reluctant to recognise such duty in its entirety. 
Subsequent decisions have fallen short of Eketone 's far-reaching principles, despite the 
efforts of Goddard CJ in the Employment Court. In Ford v Capital Trusts Ltd
133 Goddard 
CJ granted an interim injunction against the employer citing a campaign of 
misinformation. The employer had sent a memorandum to the employees, that was 
critical of the union ' s handling of the dispute. Later that year, Colgan J refused to grant 
an interim injunction on a similar fact scenario in Couling v Carter Holt Harvey.
134 
Colgan J held that communications about negotiations did not necessarily amount to 
negotiations themselves, and that s 12(2) of the ECA did not constitute a blanket ban on 
such communications. 
Goddard CJ responded to this issue in New Zealand Airline Pilots Association v Airways 
Corporation of New Zealand Limited.
135 He held that whilst it may be a question of fact 
whether a particular communication formed part of the negotiations, it was possible for 
communications that were deemed not to be part of the negotiations to constitute a failure 
by the employer to recognise the authority provided for in sl2(2) and a failure to respect 
the employee ' s choice under slO. Goddard CJ added that a union's request to the 
employer not to communicate directly with employees would indicate that the union 
would perceive such communications to be tantamount to interference with the union's 
ability to communicate efficiently. Therefore by communicating directly, the employer 
risks that the union ' s perception will be held to be reasonable and the employer may be 
held responsible for this interference. 
132 Foodstuffs (Auckland) Ltd v National Distribution Union (Inc) [ 1995] 2NZLR 280 
133 (1995] 2ERNZ 47 
134 
[ 1995] 4NZELC 98 , 363 
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The Employment Court decision in New Zealand Medical Laboratory Workers Union v 
Capital Coast Health Ltd, 136 held that, where an employer's actions were intended to 
disadvantage employees in their ability to negotiate, it would constitute a breach of 
section 12(2). The Court explained that "negotiations" were not confined to the formal 
aspects of the process, describing them as an "amorphous process" encompassing all 
stages from the initial offer and including the use of tactics to force the pace of the 
negotiations or to affect their shape. 137 Actions intended to "undermine the authority of 
the representative" were likely to be unlawful regardless of the motives of the 
employer. 138 
The Court of Appeal decision in Capital Coast Health Ltd v New Zealand Medical 
Laboratory Workers Union lnc 139 indicated that it was prepared to treat employer's 
communications more leniently than Goddard CJ had intended in Ford and Airways 
Corporation. The Court made it clear that it regarded its role as a practical one of 
balancing the competing rights of the parties - "those of the employer under s 14 of the 
Bill of Rights Act, and those of the employee under s 12 of the Employment Contracts 
Act." 140 The employer's communications in this case were held to be legitimate on the 
grounds that they were on the correct side of the fine line between communications by 
employers to workers that were " informing and warning (which are permissible), and 
threatening if a negotiating position is not available (which is not permissible)". 141 
Ultimately, the New Zealand courts have stopped short of imposing a duty on employers 
to bargain in good faith . Whilst the courts have been prepared to impose common law 
obligations of mutual trust and confidence on contractual relationships, following Capital 
Coast Health they seem unlikely to impose a requirement that the parties make every 
135 WEC 72/95 ; Employment Court judgment given 14 November 1995. 
136 [1994] 2ERNZ 93. 
137 Capital Coast Health, above n 136, I 17 . 
138 Capital Coast Health, above nl36, 127-128. 
139 
[ 1996] I NZLR 7 
140 Above n 13 9, at 18 per Hardie Boys J 
14 1 Above n 139, at 19 per Hardie Boys J 
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effort to come to a collective agreement. 142 The subsequent Court of Appeal decision 
New Zealand Fire Service Commission v fvamy 143 decided the treatment of this issue 
w1der the ECA. 
The Jvamy decisions affirmed Capital Coast Health's comments concerning the need to 
'strike a balance' between the competing interests of the parties. 144 The majority decision 
signalled a much more conservative approach to the interpretation of s I 2(2), particularly 
in Gault J's decision. Gault J interpreted "freedom of association" under the BORA 
narrowly, as referring only to the right to join a union, with no suggestion of an ability to 
associate with the union any further. He also narrowed the interpretation of freedom of 
association under the ECA to give priority to the freedom of expression (of employers) 
over the rights of employees to freely associate or negotiate for the purposes of collective 
bargaining. In allowing freedom of expression to trump freedom of association in an 
industrial relations context, the majority decision in Ivamy allows the employer to require 
its employees to receive information even if the employees do not wish to receive the 
information in that manner or format. 
It is worth noting that Gault J's decision in Jvamy makes no reference to the international 
standards that he focussed so closely on in his findings in £ketone. In Gault J's narrow 
interpretation of the right to freedom of association, he failed to have to regard to s5(a) of 
the ECA which recognises freedom of association as a right for the purposes of 
advancing the employee's position. International obligations regard the right to freedom 
of association in the same light. 
In his forceful dissenting judgment in Jvamy, Thomas J pointed to the overall effect of the 
majority decision as giving a clear indication that considerable power has been given to 
the employers: 
14 2 Novitz, above nl6, 135. 
143 
[ 1996] I ERNZ 85 
144 Above 11143, at 99-100 
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Whilst ostensibly pr-oceeding in accordance with the format provided by the subsection, 
negotiations will be diverted from or subordinated to the objective of 'winning the hearts 
and minds' of the employees in a manner which is an affront to the requirements of that 
subsection. In the result, the statutory right - described by the Minister as a fundamental 
right - for employees 'to choose whether they bargain collectively' will be curtailed. 
In taking such a conservative stance, the majority decision in lvamy affirmed earlier 
Privy Council and Canadian Supreme Court decisions that a constitutional freedom of 
association amounts to nothing more than the freedom to join a union; the freedom to 
assemble. It need not involve the right to do anything in association.
145 In effect, the 
status of freedom of association has been downgraded and disassociated from the right to 
bargain collectively through a representative.
146 Whilst not referring to these cases 
directly in the Ivamy judgment, by adopting a narrow and restrictive view of freedom of 
association, the Court of Appeal has followed the line of reasoning advanced by these 
Privy Council and Canadian Supreme Court decisions. 
There have been no significant New Zealand cases that deal with freedom of association 
in an industrial relations setting since the Jvamy decision. The right to freedom of 
association as conferred in the ECA represents an ongoing tension between legal and 
social freedom. Legal freedom has no true value unless the individual has sufficient 
power to make use of it. Thus, legal freedom is contingent upon an individual's degree of 
social freedom.
147 Many international human rights instruments recognise this principle 
through the active promotion of freedom of association and the process of collective 
bargaining. The ECA confers little more than the right to assembly, and by strengthening 
this position in the Jvamy decision, the Court of Appeal has effectively nullified any 
rights conferred by section 8 and 12. 
145 See Collymore v A-G of Trinidad [ 1970] AC 538 (PC); Reference Re Public Service Employee Relatiom 
Act (1987] I SCR 313; and Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v Government of Saskatchewan 
(1987] 1SCR460. 
146 Gordon Anderson, "Recent Case and Comment" ( 1996) 4 ELB 64 , 68 . 
147 Boyd, above n20, 78. 
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Clearly, compliance with international standards, as e~tablished by the ILO, would 
require a substantial review of the current system to give rise to the active enforcement of 
freedom of association in its broad context, and the active promotion of collective 
bargaining. It is unlikely that these changes will occur within the framework of the 
current legislation, and it seems imminent that new industrial relations legislation that 
conforms to international standards would be required in order for New Zealand to fulfil 
such obligations. 
4 NZCTU's Complaint to the !LO Concerning the Employment 
Contracts Act 
In 1991 the NZCTU brought a complaint to the ILO on the grounds that it was in breach 
of two of the 110' s core Conventions, 87 and 98. Both Conventions are recognised as 
founding ILO conventions that all states are obliged to observe by membership of the 
ILO itself regardless of ratification. 
The NZCTU's complaint comprised five parts, as detailed below.
148 
First, that the ECA did not promote collective bargaining, as set out by Article 4 of 
Convention 98. Under the ECA, collective agreements were not in fact "collective" in its 
true sense, but rather an aggregate of individual agreements. 
Secondly, there was an inadequate consultation process when the Employment Contracts 
Bill was passed on two grounds. Firstly, the Bill was not amended even though the 
majority of submissions were critical of it, and secondly, that the process was contrary to 
the spirit of tripartism fundamental to the ILO. 
The CTU also claimed that the ECA was contrary to the principle that parties should 
bargain in good faith and make every effort to reach agreement. There was no 
requirement under the ECA to bargain in good faith, and the possibility of good faith 
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bargaining was further eroded by employer interference in worker organisations, and 
discrimination against legitimate workers' organisations. 
Fourthly, it was claimed that the ECA did not provide scope for multi-employer 
bargaining at any level, and finally, that the ECA unduly restricted the right to strike.
149 
The CF A expressed concern in its interim report "that the emphasis on individual 
responsibility for bargaining in the Act. .. can be detrimental to collective bargaining".
150 
The CF A upheld almost all of the CTU' s complaints, except in relation to the last two 
issues. Here the ILO concluded respectively that unions; rights of access to workplaces 
were adequate under the ECA, and secondly, that the New Zealand Government did not, 
on the evidence provided, intervene improperly in negotiations. The Interim Report 
concluded that "taken as a whole, the Act does not encourage and promote collective 
bargaining" and recommended that the Government take appropriate steps to ensure that 
the legislation comply with Convention 87 by promoting and encouraging collective 
bargaining. 
The Committee later sent a mission to New Zealand to investigate the matter further and 
produce a final report after hearing further submissions from the Government and CTU. 
The CFA's Final Report reiterated many of the Interim Report's sentiments, and rejected 
the New Zealand Government's argument that the ECA had led to an improvement in 
New Zealand's economic situation. Economic efficiency, according to the CFA, was not 
the issue. Rather, economic management should comply with the basic principles of 
freedom of association. 151 The CF A took note of recent New Zealand case law 
developments which suggested the courts would take action to protect workers from 
certain abuses, such as an employer's attempt to exercise undue influence or bypass a 
148 Ross Wilson, "The Decade of Non-Compliance; the New Zealand Government record of non-
compliance with international labour standards 1990-1998" 25(1) NZJIR, 79-94, 86. 
149 Nigel Haworth and Stephen Hughes, "Under Scrutiny: The ECA, the ILO, and the NZCTU Complaint 
1993-1995"(1996)20(2)NZJIR 143 , 150. 
15° Case No 1698, 1994, 230 para 728 
151 Case No 1698, 1994, 278, paras 237-238 
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duly appointed bargaining agent.
152 However, the CFA was unsure "whether and to what 
extent the reasoning of the courts applies to other issues" that were raised by the 
NZCTU's complaint, such as employer interference and domination. Moreover, "from a 
general perspective, questions also arise concerning the existence and extent of a duty to 
bargain collectively".
153 
The CF A also looked to unequal bargaining power, and commented that most of 
problems found in the ECA originated in the Act's philosophy that individual and 
collective contracts, and individual and collective representation, were equivalent to each 
other. The Committee found it difficult to reconcile this with the ILO's principles on 
collective bargaining. The Committee doubted that, given the superior power of 
employers in an individual bargaining situation, employees would have the choice to 
engage in collective bargaining, until the government actively promoted collective 
b · · 154 argammg. 
The Report stressed the importance of the duty to bargain in good faith, and commented 
that the ability to bypass authorised representatives may be "detrimental to the principle 
that negotiation between employers and organisations of workers should be encouraged 
and promoted".
155 The CFA regard the duty to bargain in good faith as the ideal 
compromise between the active promotion of collective bargaining the preservation of 
the freedom of choice. 
156 
The CF A acknowledged that the ECA was intended to give effect to freedom of choice 
for the parties to a contract, but that the second aspect of the freedom of association, the 
promotion of collective bargaining, was absent, and therefore the Act did not actively 
promote freedom of association in its broad sense. 
157 The CF A report concluded with a 
152 New Zealand Medical Laboratory Workers Union Inc v Capital Coast Health Ltd [ 1994] 2ERNZ 
93 
upheld on appeal in Capital Coast Health Ltd v New Zealand Medical Laboratory Workers Union Inc 
[1996] I ERNZ 7 
153 295'" Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association, Case No 1698, 1994, 80-83, paras 242
-249. 
154 Case No 1698, 1994, 80-83, paras 255-258 
155 Case No 1698, 1994, p83, para253 
156 Novitz, above n 16, 124. 
157 Novitz, above n 16, 130. 
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recommendation to the New Zealand Government that it take active steps to promote and 
encourage collective bargaining. 158 
The outcome of this decision must take into account the purely advisory role of the ILO. 
There is no compulsion on the New Zealand Government to ensure the provisions of the 
ECA conform to the Committee's recommendations. The future of collective bargaining 
and trade union organisation under the ECA is in jeopardy because without the active 
promotion of collective bargaining, freedom of association under the Act conveys little 
more than the right to assemble. As we shall see in the next section, the 1996 Court of 
Appeal decision New Zealand Fire Service Commission v Jvam/ 59 further extinguished 
any notion of the promotion of collective bargaining. 
C The Future: The Employment Relations Act 
The Employment Relations Act ("ERA") comes into effect on 2 October 2000, and is the 
implementation of the Labour Government' s repeal of the ECA, enacted in 1991 under a 
National Government. It introduces a framework for the conduct of employment relations 
based on the understanding that employment is a human relationship involving issues of 
mutual trust, confidence and fair dealing. The employment relationship is not simply a 
contractual, economic exchange. 
The primary objective of the ERA is to "build productive employment relations through 
the promotion of mutual trust and confidence in all aspects of the employment 
environment. '' 160 To achieve this objective the Act recognises that employment 
relationships must be built on good faith behaviour, and acknowledges and addresses the 
inherent inequality of bargaining power in employment relationships. It promotes 
collective bargaining whilst protecting the integrity of individual choice. The ERA also 
seeks to promote observance in New Zealand of the principles underlying ILO 
Conventions 87 and 98 . 
158 Case No 1698, 1994, 84 para 255 
159 
[ 1996] I ERNZ 85 
160 s3( I )(a) ERA 2000 . 
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In order to address the issues presented, the Act promotes the voluntary organisation of 
workers through unions and collective bargaining as the best way to redress bargaining 
power imbalances, while giving individuals choice on how the terms and conditions are 
negotiated, either individually or collectively. It espouses that the employee relationship 
itself should be conducted in such a way so as to promote good faith, fair dealing and 
mutual trust and confidence between the parties. 
I Good Faith 
The concept of good faith underpins the ERA in its entirety, extending beyond collective 
bargaining to include the ongoing relationships among employers, unions and employees. 
It will be required in any circumstance in which an employer is making business 
decisions that may impact upon its employees' employment interests. 161 This can include 
where the employer is considering a proposal to contract out work and in situations that 
may give rise to redundancies. 162 
The simple requirement of this good faith concept is that the parties to employment 
relationships - unions, employers and employees - deal with each other in good faith, 
and that those dealings are based on fair dealing and mutual trust and confidence. This 
includes, but is not limited to, not directly or indirectly misleading or deceiving each 
other. "Good faith" itself is not defined in the ERA, but core good faith duties for 
collective bargaining are. 163 These core duties include the parties using their best 
endeavours to agree on a process for conducting the bargaining in an effective and 
efficient manner; the parties meeting for the purpose of bargaining; and considering and 
responding to any proposals made by the other party. The role and authority of any 
representative must be recognised, and there is a duty not to bargain, negotiate or 
communicate directly about employment conditions with those for whom the 
representative acts. 
16 1 s4(4) ERA 2000. 
162 Joanna Holden "The Brave New World of Employment Relations" Chapman Tripp Counsel 23 March 
2000, 2. http ://www.chapmantripp.co.Ncw Zcaland/publish/c230300 .htm 
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Good faith bargaining under the ERA is directed to the process of bargaining, rather than 
the outcome, although of course the outcome is dealt with under the Act and must comply 
with good faith requirements. Good faith bargaining does not require the parties lo agree 
on any matter, or to enter into a collective agreement. 
2 Freedom of Association 
The ERA balances collective and individual employment rights by retaining the freedom 
currently enjoyed under the ECA to join or not to join a union.
164 Any preference or 
undue influence in employment arrangements designed to influence the choice of 
whether or not to become, remain, or cease to be, a union member, is prohibited.
165 
3 Unions 
The ERA makes provision for the lawful operation of unions, in recognition of the 
inherent imbalance in bargaining power that can be redressed through collective 
bargaining. It places the union movement at the centre of all collective bargaining. This is 
a radical shift from the position of unions under the ECA, where they were no legal 
recognition as representatives of employees' interests. 
The Act recognises unions as the only lawful representative of employees' collective 
interests. It entitles unions to represent their members in relation to any matter involving 
their collective interests, and also allows unions to represent employees in relation to 
their individual rights, provided they have the employee's authorisation. 
4 Collective Bargaining 
Collective bargaining is a cornerstone of the new legislation. One of the objectives is to 
build "productive employment relationships through the promotion of collective 
bargaining." 166 Part V of the Act deals with collective bargaining, and how the objective 
163 s35 ERA 2000. 
164 s8 ERA 2000 . 
165 s9 ERA 2000 . 
166 s3( I )(a) ERA 2000 . 
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is to be achieved. This includes the introduction of the good faith concept into collective 
bargaining. Under the ERA, multi-party bargaining is encouraged. 
Only employers and registered unions will be able to negotiate and be parties to 
collective agreements. The parties to collective bargaining must meet specific good faith 
obligations, but these do not require unions or employers to settle, or include particular 
. 167 
matters m, agreements. 
All collective agreements must state the term and coverage of the agreement, the term not 
to exceed three years. It must make provision for variations to the agreement during its 
term, and must be in writing. 
All collective agreements will contain an implied term that employees bound by it will 
continue to be employed by the employer for the term of the agreement. This provision is 
intended to provide employment security and certainty in situations where work or 
employees are contracted out, or where an employer sells the business. It does not limit 
the employer's right to dismiss an employee for just cause, and the implied term may be 
varied or excluded from the collective contract by mutual agreement. 
5 The Act's Effect on New Zealand's Observance of !LO Conventions 87 
and 98 
The new legislation makes a significant effort to bring New Zealand's industrial relations 
environment within the standards set by the ILO Conventions 87 and 98. The ERA sets 
out in its founding section, the desire to "promote observance in New Zealand of the 
principles underlying International Labour Organisation Convention 87 on Freedom of 
Association, and Convention 98 on the Right to Organise and Bargain Collectively."
168 
The details set out above concerning the provisions of the new legislation show that this 
effort is a genuine one on the part of the Labour Government. The ERA will pave the 
167 See Section V(C)(4) above. 
168 s3(l)(b) ERA 2000. 
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way for New Zealand to fulfil its international labour obligations in terms of the ILO 
conventions for the first time since the ILO came into being in 1919. 
It is not possible at this stage to comment further on New Zealand ' s reception of the 
legislation, or on the judicial interpretation of it in industrial disputes. However, it will be 
interesting to see what impact the introduction of good faith bargaining and the re-
introduction of collective bargaining has on industrial disputes generally, and on the 
judicial interpretation of disputes specifically. 
V CONCLUSION 
New Zealand's historical industrial relations structures have not placed a high emphasis 
on the enforcement of the freedom of association, although collective bargaining was an 
implicit part of the framework until the enactment of the ECA in 1991. Union 
membership in the New Zealand private sector was, for all practical purposes, 
compulsory from 1936 until the ECA in 1991 , with the exception of a brief period in 
1983-1984. Compulsory unionism is clearly contrary to international standards on 
freedom of association, and the legislative reforms of which the ECA was a part, 
reflected the need to give greater emphasis to this right. 
The right to freedom of association as conferred in the ECA represents an ongoing 
tension between legal and social freedom. Legal freedom has no true value unless the 
individual has sufficient power to make use of it. Thus, legal freedom is contingent upon 
an individual ' s degree of social freedom. 169 Many international human rights instruments 
recognise this principle through the active promotion of freedom of association and the 
process of collective bargaining. The ECA confers little more than the right to assembly, 
and by strengthening this position in the Jvamy decision, the Court of Appeal has 
effectively nullified any rights conferred by section 8 and 12 . 
169 Boyd, above n20,.78 . 
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Clearly, compliance with international standards, as established by the ILO, requires a 
substantial review of the current system to give rise to the active enforcement of freedom 
of association in its broad context, and the active promotion of collective bargaining. 
New industrial relations legislation that conforms to international standards is required in 
order for New Zealand to fulfil such obligations. The introduction of the Employment 
Relations Act, which comes into force on 2 October this year, fulfils these criteria. 
Freedom of association is protected under the ERA, and collective bargaining is 
reintroduced into the industrial relations environment, and encouraged to be used as a 
means of redressing the inherent imbalance of bargaining power that exists between 
employers and employees. 
The introduction of the concept of good faith is intended by the Labour Government to 
encourage and to foster an industrial relations environment and employment relationships 
that are based on mutual trust and confidence. 
It is submitted that under the new legislation, the barriers that previously prevented New 
Zealand from ratifying ILO Conventions 87 and 98 - are removed, and New Zealand may 
now entertain the possibility, for the first time since the inception of industrial law in 
New Zealand, that it affirms the principles and standards set out by the ILO. 
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